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harvest on e-readers and invest in e-books. Complementarity provides the firm a novel dimension of
consumer heterogeneity (the relative demand elasticities between e-readers and e-books) to exploit. The joint
IPD strategy provides a better screening device for more profitable consumers and limits consumer's ability to
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ABSTRACT
DYNAMIC DEMAND AND PRICING STRATEGY IN E-BOOK MARKET
Hui Li
Holger Sieg
E-reading has experienced rapid growth in the past few years and has raised new
questions. On the supply side, retailers such as Amazon jointly sell e-readers and
e-books. It remains unclear how they can coordinate the two products to conduct
intertemporal price discrimination (IPD). On the demand side, it remains unclear
how much of e-book sales come from cannibalizing print books and how much serve
as market expansion to the book business.
I empirically address these questions using individual-level data from 2008 to
2012. I estimate a dynamic structural model of consumer e-reader adoption and
subsequent book purchases, including quantity, reading format (e-book or print book),
and retailer choices (Amazon, other online retailers, or oﬄine bookstores) in a number
of book genres. The estimation reveals two consumer types, avid readers and general
readers, who self-select into buying e-readers based on their unobserved heterogeneous
book tastes. Compared with general readers, avid readers buy more books, adopt
e-readers earlier, and have larger cannibalization rates. The two types also have
different relative demand elasticities between e-readers and e-books.
Given the estimated demand system, I simulate the optimal dynamic pricing
strategies of e-readers and e-books for the monopolist retailer Amazon who faces
forward-looking consumers. I find that Amazon should harvest on e-readers and
invest in e-books. Complementarity provides the firm a novel dimension of consumer
heterogeneity (the relative demand elasticities between e-readers and e-books) to
exploit. The joint IPD strategy provides a better screening device for more profitable
consumers and limits consumer’s ability to intertemporally arbitrage.
v
To evaluate the impact of e-books on print book sales, I simulate the world
without e-books and compare it with the observed one. I find that 42% of e-book sales
come from cannibalizing print book sales and that 58% come from market expansion.
Of the cannibalization effect, oﬄine bookstores bear 53% of the cannibalization loss,
while Amazon bears 32% and other online retailers bear 15%. I further explore
how the impact of e-books would change under alternative pricing arrangements.
Overall, the results have managerial implications to publishers, book retailers, and
policymakers in the e-book market.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
There has been significant growth in e-reading since Amazon, the largest on-
line book retailer, launched its first e-reading device, the Kindle e-reader, in 2007.
Consumers first buy an e-reader and then buy e-books from the same retailer. By
providing e-readers that are affordable and pricing e-books of new releases and New
York Times best sellers at $9.99, Amazon substantially promoted the diffusion of e-
reading. E-book sales enjoyed triple-digit annual growth rates from 2008 to 2011 and
accounted for 23.8% of the total trade-book unit sales in 2013 (Book Industry Study
Group, BookStats 2011, 2014). Yet print book sales declined during the same period,
making publishers concerned that e-book sales grew at the expense of the traditional
print book business.1
The diffusion of e-reading raises questions for retailers and publishers. On the
supply side, it remains unclear how retailers can dynamically coordinate the pricing
of e-readers and e-books to better conduct intertemporal price discrimination (IPD).
The pricing question is not unique to the e-book market; firms in other industries
also jointly sell durable primary hardware and complementary software, especially in
digital and online businesses (e.g., consoles and video games, Apple TVs and digital
1See http://www.engadget.com/2011/04/15/e-book-sales-triple-year-over-year-paper
-books-decline-in-every/.
1
content in iTunes, razors and blades, printers and cartridges). Complementarity is
reflected by the fact that (1) consumers need to buy the primary hardware to con-
sume the complementary software, and (2) the usage intensity of the complementary
software drives the adoption of the primary hardware.
Two incentives exist for both hardware and software pricing. For hardware, as
in the classic razor-and-blades strategy, firms can set low hardware prices to “invest”
and penetrate the market so that they can earn from subsequent software sales.
Firms can also exploit consumer heterogeneity and “harvest” on the hardware by
conducting IPD; they can open with high prices to skim high-valuation consumers and
then cut prices later to appeal to low-valuation consumers. For software, firms have
incentives to “invest” in new consumers and “harvest” on existing consumers. As the
consumer mix evolves over time, it is potentially beneficial for firms to dynamically
price software as well. Furthermore, hardware and software pricing are linked, as
software price affects the attractiveness of hardware and the hardware price affects
the number of software users. In practice, firms either conduct IPD separately for
hardware and software without fully exploiting the link between them (e.g., consoles
and video games) or conduct IPD only for hardware, keeping the software price stable
(e.g., Amazon Kindle and e-books). The possibility of joint IPD on both hardware
and software remains understudied by both researchers and practitioners.
On the demand side, it remains unclear how e-books have reshaped the publishing
industry. In particular, how much of e-book sales come from cannibalizing print book
sales, and how much would not have occurred and serve as market expansion to the
book business? How are different print book retailers affected by the introduction
of e-books? In practice, publishers were concerned about cannibalization from low-
priced e-books and conspired with Apple to raise e-book prices in 2010, which drew
scrutiny from the Department of Justice and caused a broad debate over e-book
2
pricing.2 Evaluating the degrees of cannibalization and market expansion helps us
understand how publishers and book retailers such as Amazon and oﬄine bookstores
are affected by the introduction of e-books, as well as how they should optimally
respond.
This dissertation empirically addresses these questions. It provides insights on
the e-book market from both the supply and the demand perspectives. I start with
estimating a dynamic demand system of books and e-readers and fit the model to
individual transaction data from 2008 to 2012. Given the estimated demand system, I
numerically solve for the optimal joint IPD strategies and conduct counterfactuals on
cannibalization and market expansion. Firms sell hardware (i.e., e-readers) and soft-
ware (i.e., e-books) to heterogeneous consumers and jointly conduct dynamic pricing
on both products. Forward-looking consumers may anticipate future price changes
and intertemporally arbitrage. Firms need to account for this strategic behavior in
addition to the harvesting and investing incentives.
In the discrete-continuous demand model, consumers choose whether to buy a
new e-reader or upgrade to the latest generation. Consumers then maximize their
direct utility from books by choosing book quantity, reading format (e-books or print
books), and retailer for print books (Amazon.com, other online retailers, or oﬄine
bookstores) in a number of book genres. Instead of using a standard discrete choice
model and capturing the book usage in a reduced-form way, I explicitly model book
consumption as a continuous choice. Consumers can buy multiple books. Their book
usage is endogenized to be a function of their unobserved heterogeneous reading tastes
and book prices. Book usage further drives e-reader adoption so that e-book prices
affect e-reader attractiveness. Consumers respond to price changes by adjusting the
number of books to buy, and whether and when to adopt e-readers. The demand
system is estimated without assuming that the observed prices are optimal.
2See http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/apple/apple-direct.html.
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I find that consumers are highly heterogeneous in book and e-reader consump-
tion. The data identify two major consumer types: avid readers who have higher
unobserved reading tastes and general readers who have lower unobserved reading
tastes. Estimation results imply that avid readers buy more books and adopt e-
readers earlier. They are less price elastic to both e-readers and e-books than general
readers in the absolute terms. Yet avid readers are relatively more price elastic to
e-books than to e-readers, while general readers are relatively more price elastic to
e-readers than to e-books. The intuition is that avid readers buy more books and
spend more on books than on e-readers relative to general readers. They care more
about subsequent book prices when buying e-readers. Note that the difference in
avid readers’ and general readers’ relative demand elasticity between the two prod-
ucts is not an imposed assumption; it comes from consumers’ endogenous choices in
the model. This difference is the key driving force of the supply-side pricing policy.
Given the demand estimates, I numerically solve for the optimal joint IPD strate-
gies and address three questions. What is the optimal e-reader and e-book price
trajectory combination? How can firms benefit from joint IPD on both products
compared with IPD only on e-readers? When is dynamic pricing better and when is
fixed pricing better for e-books? Rather than trying to rationalize the observed pric-
ing strategy, I take a normative view and focus on the scenario in which a monopolist
Amazon makes dynamic pricing decisions to maximize total profits from e-readers,
print books, and e-books. Both consumers and Amazon are forward-looking in the
pure-strategy Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE). I focus on the pricing prob-
lem and take cost, product availability, and quality from the data. Observed e-reader
costs have dropped over time and might drive down prices. I define harvesting (in-
vesting) as decreasing (increasing) mark-ups over time to avoid the confusion. Prices
can still drop in an investing strategy if costs drop faster than prices.
I find that the optimal joint IPD strategy is to harvest on e-readers and invest in
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e-books. If the firm conducts IPD only on e-readers and optimally commits to a fixed
e-book price, it should invest in e-readers. Simulation results show that conducting
IPD on both products benefits the firm in two ways. First, it offers the firm a
better screening device to induce a higher fraction of more profitable consumers to
buy. Second, it limits consumers’ ability to intertemporally arbitrage by providing
incentives both to delay purchase and to buy earlier. The profitability of the joint
IPD policy, compared with IPD only on e-readers, depends on the composition of
heterogeneous consumers in the initial market. The joint IPD policy increases five-
year total profits by $837 million if 30% of consumers are avid readers. If the fraction
of avid readers is too low, it is better to commit to a fixed e-book price.
The novelty of the complementary setting is that the firm can exploit a new
dimension of consumer heterogeneity, namely, the relative demand elasticities between
the two products. Traditional single-product IPD exploits the heterogeneity in the
demand elasticities across consumer types: Avid readers are less price elastic than
general readers to both e-readers and e-books. The joint IPD policy further exploits
the heterogeneity in the relative demand elasticities between the two products within
each consumer type: Avid readers are more price elastic to e-books than to e-readers,
while general readers are more price elastic to e-readers than to e-books. Firms can
exploit the two-dimensional heterogeneity to price discriminate. The optimal pricing
policy is a function of the penetration rates of consumers in each type. I find that
for any given general (avid) reader penetration rate, as the avid (general) reader
penetration rate increases, the firm should harvest (invest) on e-readers and invest
(harvest) in e-books.3 The overall policy depends on the market composition. In
general, the retailer can use different joint price trajectories (i.e., harvesting on e-
readers and investing in e-books, or investing in e-readers and harvesting on e-books)
to induce different consumer types to purchase. The joint IPD policy serves as a
3Notice that consumer types are still unobserved to the firm. This result is a characteristic of
the policy functions, which are functions of the penetration rates in each consumer type.
5
better screening device for more profitable consumers.
The framework can be applied to other industries in which the usage intensity of
the software drives the adoption of the hardware. In other words, consumers are self-
selected into buying the hardware given their heterogeneous tastes on the software.
This feature is central to the dynamic pricing strategies. Different usage intensity
leads to different relative demand elasticities between the two products, which in
turn drives the pricing policy. Two modeling decisions are important to get unbiased
estimates: (1) accounting for consumer heterogeneity in reading tastes, as different
types of consumers generate different book revenues and respond differently to e-book
prices, and (2) accounting for the dynamic device adoption decision, as it allows for
self-selection based on heterogeneous consumer tastes. Modeling self-selection pro-
duces more accurate estimates, as the adoption behavior contains information about
the consumer’s heterogeneous taste. Meanwhile, ignoring self-selection would yield
incorrect model predictions. To see this, consider two pricing arrangements in a static
setting: 1) high e-reader prices and low e-book prices, and 2) low e-reader prices and
high e-book prices. A model without self-selection ignores the fact that consumers
differ in their consumption of the two products and react to the two pricing arrange-
ments differently. The model would thus predict that the two pricing arrangements
(at some price levels) induce the same number of homogeneous adopters and make no
difference to the retailer. However, my model with self-selection would predict that
the former induces more avid-reader adopters, while the latter induces more general-
reader adopters. The compositions of adopters under the two scenarios have different
pricing implications for the firm. Similar logic applies to the intertemporal case, once
I replace “high price” with harvesting and “low price” with investing. Ignoring self-
selection would provide biased estimates of the mix of consumers and in turn biased
predictions on dynamic pricing strategies and cannibalization and market expansion
effects.
6
In Chapter 7, “Cannibalization or Market Expansion? The Impact of E-Books
on Print Book Sales,” I use the demand estimates to evaluate how e-books have re-
shaped the publishing industry, i.e., the interaction of digital and traditional products
in the publishing industry. I first calculate the degrees of cannibalization and mar-
ket expansion given observed e-reader and e-book prices. I simulate a world without
e-books and compare it with the observed one. First, I find that 42% of e-book sales
come from cannibalizing print book sales and that 58% come from market expansion.
Of the e-books sales that come from cannibalization, 53% would have occurred in
oﬄine bookstores, 32% on Amazon, and 15% on other online retailers. Amazon bears
a higher cannibalization burden over time as print book sales shift from other retailers
to Amazon. Accounting for all the retailers, the gain from market expansion is larger
than the loss from cannibalization for the publishers. Second, I find that the effect
magnitudes differ across consumer types. Avid readers have higher cannibalization
rates than general readers do; a higher percentage of avid readers’ e-book consump-
tion comes from cannibalization. The difference leads to a declining industrywide
cannibalization rate over time as more general readers adopt e-readers and start to
buy e-books. Although both avid readers and general readers buy more books after
adopting e-readers, they do not always bring more profits. The industry benefits
more from converting general readers to e-book readers, while Amazon benefits more
from converting avid readers. Third, I find that the effect magnitudes differ across
genres. “Casual” e-books are stronger substitutes for paperbacks than “lifestyle” and
“practical” e-books.
I further ask how the impact of e-books would change under counterfactual pric-
ing arrangements. In particular, I raise e-book prices by $2, similar to what publishers
and Apple did in 2010, and explore whether the publishing industry would benefit
from this price change. Fully evaluating the impact of raising e-book prices requires
accounting for e-reader pricing response. I solve for the optimal dynamic e-reader
7
pricing strategies of the monopolist retailer Amazon given different e-book prices. I
then compare the market outcomes given new e-book and e-reader prices. The results
suggest that increasing e-book prices by $2 makes the industry worse off. The loss
from a smaller market expansion effect outweighs the gain from a smaller cannibal-
ization effect. The key is that Kindle owners buy fewer e-books given higher e-book
prices, which lowers the gain for Amazon to convert nonowners to owners. Amazon
thus increases Kindle prices, which substantially discourages general readers from
adopting Kindles and creating market expansion.
The dissertation contributes to the pricing literature by studying IPD in the
complementary product case. There have been studies on dynamic pricing of a single
product (e.g., Stokey, 1979, 1981; Besanko and Winston, 1990; Nair, 2007; Hendel and
Nevo, 2013; and Lazarev, 2013) and static pricing of complementary products (e.g.,
Gil and Hartmann, 2009). Little is known, however, about dynamic pricing of com-
plementary products. In a complementary product setting, Leung (1997) and Koh
(2006) theoretically study durable product IPD in the existence of a flat-rate comple-
mentary product. They show that “investing” incentives can outweigh “harvesting”
incentives so that increasing prices of the durable product over time is optimal. Nair
(2007) and Liu (2010) empirically study IPD in the video game and console industry.
They focus on single-product IPD and abstract from either software pricing or hard-
ware pricing. I diverge from the extant literature by modeling the dynamic pricing
decisions of both products. In particular, I also allow for IPD on the complemen-
tary product and for self-selection based on heterogeneous tastes. This enables me to
discover new joint IPD strategies that take advantage of the complementarity.
I also contribute to the literature on complementary products, including tying
and bundling. Most studies in this area are developed in a static setting (e.g., Gil and
Hartmann 2009). Recent studies empirically explore dynamic demand of complemen-
tary products (e.g., Hartmann and Nair, 2010; Sriram, Chintagunta, and Agarwal,
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2010; and Derdenger and Kumar, 2013). This dissertation extends the literature by
modeling both the dynamic demand and supply pricing problem. It also contributes
to the nascent empirical literature on dynamic pricing problems in which both firms
and consumers are forward-looking (e.g., Nair, 2007; Goettler and Gordon, 2011).
State-of-the-art numerical methods allow me to solve for a model in which consumers’
dynamic e-reader adoption is endogenous to the retailer’s pricing strategy rather than
an exogenously evolving diffusion process. The demand model shares features with
dynamic models of technology adoption (e.g., Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012; Lee,
2013; and Melnikov, 2013).
The counterfactual on the impact of e-books contributes to the literature on the
interactions between the Internet and brick-and-mortar economies. There has been
evidence of cannibalization between online newspapers and physical ones (Gentzkow,
2007), YouTube viewing and television viewing (Waldfogel, 2007), file sharing and
record sales (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2007), and PDF and print format (Kan-
nan, Pope, and Jain, 2009). I complement this literature by empirically examining
the e-book case and taking into account the device adoption decision.
This dissertation provides managerial implications for publishers, Amazon, and
other print book retailers in the book market. For publishers, the overall market
expansion effect outweighs the cannibalization effect. I find that both avid readers
and general readers read more after they become e-reader owners based on the model
estimates. E-books still make the industry better off, despite that this format causes
a redistribution of sales among retailers. For Amazon, I propose a novel joint IPD
strategy to better coordinate the dynamic pricing of e-books and e-readers. I also
provide some explanation as to why Amazon prices Kindles and e-books at or below
cost. Although Amazon bears the cannibalization loss as a print book retailer, it
benefits from e-books in three ways: (1) additional e-book sales because of market
expansion, (2) additional print book sales driven by e-reader adopters (i.e., e-books
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accelerate the shift of book sales from other retailers to Amazon), and (3) spillover
effect to other product categories. If gains are large enough, Amazon would have
strong incentives to promote e-book and e-reader sales, even at a loss. For policy-
makers, they should be aware that publishers and Amazon might have different, even
conflicting, incentives and strategies for developing e-reading. They should also take
a long-term view about the impact of e-books on the publishing industry.
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CHAPTER 2
Data and Industry Background
2.1. The U.S. E-Book Industry
The e-book market did not experience rapid growth until Amazon released its first
e-reader, the Kindle, in 2007. Since then, the market size of e-books has grown from
$20 million to $969.9 million in 2011 (Association of American Publishers, 2012).
Amazon’s existing relationship with publishers enables it to offer a wide variety of
e-books. By providing affordable e-readers at higher qualities over time and pricing
e-books of new releases and New York Times best sellers at $9.99, Amazon’s market
share reached nearly 90% by the end of 2009. Barnes & Noble entered the e-book
market in October 2009, accounting for about 20% of all e-book sales by 2011, and
has struggled to remain profitable. Apple started to sell e-books in iBookstore and
accounted for only about 10% of total e-book sales (Gilbert, 2014). A survey on
consumer e-reading shows that the Kindle is still the dominant device used (Bowker
Market Research, 2012). As Kindle enjoyed a monopoly position from 2007 to 2009
and was the dominant e-reader from 2008 to 2012, I focus on Amazon’s optimal
IPD strategies as a monopoly of e-readers and e-books. Consumers can still buy
print books from all major retailers: Amazon.com, other online retailers, and oﬄine
bookstores.
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There are three vertical players (publishers, retailers, and consumers) and three
relevant products (print books, e-books, and e-readers) in the market. Publishers
sell books to retailers at a wholesale price, which remained stable during the sample
period. Retailers then set book retail prices to consumers. Retailers also launched
their own e-readers and set e-reader prices.4 Discussion with industry practitioners
suggests that print book launching and pricing are unaffected by e-book pricing. Thus,
I take print book prices as exogenously given from the data. Publishers’ wholesale
prices are also taken as given. As a robustness check, I allow publishers to optimally
change wholesale prices. The predictions on dynamic pricing for retailers remain
qualitatively the same.
2.2. Data Description
I combine three individual-level online transaction data sets and supplement them
with data on aggregate oﬄine book sales, cost, and e-book availability. The first
data set is the individual-level online book transaction records from 2008 to 2012
gathered by comScore.5 Each purchase record contains the retail website, purchase
4Kindle prices are always determined by Amazon, while two pricing contracts exist for books.
Under the wholesale contract, Amazon sets book retail prices and pays wholesale prices to the
publishers. Under the agency contract, publishers set book retail prices and Amazon obtains 30%
of the book revenue. Print book pricing always follows the wholesale contract. For e-books, there
has been a debate over which contract to adopt. Amazon started off with the wholesale contract
and set low e-book prices from 2007 to 2010. Publishers were concerned about the cannibalization
effect of low-priced e-books. They forced Amazon to sign the agency contract from 2010 to 2012
and raised e-book prices of the new releases and New York Times best sellers from $9.99 to $12.99-
$14.99. This drew scrutiny from the Department of Justice. The contract scheme was switched
back to the wholesale model by the Department of Justice after the lawsuit in 2012 (http://www.
nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db=special\&id=306). In Chapter 2 to Chapter 6, I build
the IPD problem based on the wholesale contract in which retailers set both e-readers and e-book
prices. In Chapter 7, I evaluate the impact of e-books based on the agency contract, which helps
link the counterfactual analysis more closely to the e-book policy change in 2010.
5The comScore Web Behavior Database captures the detailed browsing and buying behaviors of
100,000 Internet users across the United States. The panel is based on a random sample from a cross-
section of more than two million global Internet users who have given comScore explicit permissions
to confidentially capture their Web-wide activities. It is weighted so that the distribution of the
demographics matches that of the U.S. Internet user population.
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time, book title, format (print book or e-book), price, and quantity information.6
It also includes demographics such as household income and age (categorized into
groups), family size, zip code, etc. Consumers were resampled every year. Among
the online shoppers sampled by comScore, 41% bought at least one book a year.
There are 20,637 book buyers and 72,619 book purchases over the five-year sample
period. Amazon’s market share was 60% on average and increased over time as shown
in Figure 4. Hardcovers account for only 5% of the transactions. I thus group them
into “paperbacks” and use “paperbacks” to refer to all print books.
The second data set contains book genre information that I collected from Ama-
zon using web scrapers. For each book title in the first data set, I collect its genre in-
formation and prices for both paperback and e-book formats. There are 122,068 pieces
of title-format information. I group Amazon’s subgenres into three genres: “lifestyle,”
“casual,” and “practical.” Subgenres within the same genre have similar prices, read-
ing purposes, and consumers’ purchasing patterns. In particular, “lifestyle” books
usually contain more pictures. “Casual” books usually serve for entertainment pur-
poses. “Practical” books usually require in-depth reading and note-taking.7 These
features will affect how consumers perceive e-books as substitutes for paperbacks and
thus are relevant when grouping subgenres into genres.
Given that households were resampled yearly and that Kindle prices and qualities
changed annually in the data, I choose the time period as a year. For each consumer
6Book format information is available only for 2011 and 2012. In the demand-side estimation, I
integrate over the format choice when calculating the likelihood function for observations in 2008,
2009 and 2010. For instance, the probability of buying q books equals the sum of the following
three probabilities: the probability of buying q paperbacks for a Kindle nonowner, the probability of
buying q paperbacks for a Kindle owner, and the probability of buying q e-books for a Kindle owner.
See the likelihood function section for the details on constructing the latter three probabilities.
7(1) “lifestyle” genre includes “lifestyle & home,” “cooking,” “travel,” “fitness & dieting,” “crafts,
hobbies & home,” “arts & photography,” and “children’s book,” etc. (2) “casual” genre includes
“fiction,” “science fiction,” “humor,” “nonfiction,” and “biographies & memoirs,” etc. (3) “practical”
genre includes “computers & technology,” “business & investing,” “medical books,” and “education
& reference,” etc. A typical consumer in the sample buys only one or two books a year. As the
number of genres G increases, both the number of zero-consumption choices and consumers’ ex-
ante book utility (integrated over G error terms) increase by construction. G is chosen to remain
representative of the book heterogeneity while avoiding too many zero choices.
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in every period, I aggregate their book purchase records to get their genre-format-
retailer level book quantity choices in the demand model. For instance, consumer i
bought two “casual” e-books and one “practical” paperback in 2010 from Amazon. I
also calculate the average book prices at genre-format-retailer level every year using
all book titles in the first data set. The sales-weighted and unweighted prices differ
by less than 2%. I use the unweighted ones in the estimation. Of all book sales,
47% were “casual” books, 30% were “lifestyle” books, and 23% were “practical”
books. “Casual” books were the cheapest, and “practical” books were the most
expensive. Average prices of e-books were lower than paperbacks for all genres. A
typical paperback cost $17.66, and a typical e-book cost $9.72. For 75.2% of the book
titles, e-book prices were lower than their paperback prices.
The third data set contains individual-level Kindle purchase records for 2008
through 2012 from comScore. I observe purchase time, Kindle version, price, quantity,
and household demographics. Note that households in the first and the third data
sets were resampled every year by comScore. Only a limited number of households
were observed for more than one year. It implies that I cannot distinguish between
first-time device purchase and upgrading. I take a probabilistic view on the Kindle
ownership status in the model. Yearly resampling also implies that I cannot always
link individuals’ book transactions in the first data set to their device transactions in
the third data set unless they happened during the same year. I thus model consumer
behaviors by their observed and unobserved types so that for each type, it is still panel
data and both the book-side and device-side transactions are observed.
I supplement the individual-level data with other relevant information. First,
I impute aggregate oﬄine book sales from online and oﬄine retailer market shares
(Bowker’s Books & Consumers report, 2012). I obtain the oﬄine population size from
the fraction of consumers who have bought books online (Nielson Online Shopping
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Trend report, 2012).8 Second, I obtain the number of e-books available every year in
the Kindle Store from a widely cited blog that takes monthly snapshots of Amazon.9
The number of available e-books increased from 126,630 in 2008 to 1,429,500 in 2012.
Finally, I impute Kindle cost and book wholesale prices from industry reports.10 The
cost of the most popular Kindle version dropped from $236 in 2008 to $89 in 2012.
2.3. Observed Pricing and Consumption Patterns
During the sample periods from 2008 to 2012, Amazon annually launched new Kindle
generations and cut the prices for the existing ones, indicating a dynamic pricing
strategy on the device (Figure 1). Kindle sales increased over time as shown in Table
2. Unlike Kindle pricing, there was no systematic book price change over time, either
overall or by genre-format (Figure 2).11
The data also reveal consumers’ book purchase patterns. As for quantity, there
is considerable heterogeneity in that 13.8% of the consumers comprised 46.8% of the
total book purchases. As for genre, the correlation between consumers’ book genre
consumption and their observed household characteristics is small, suggesting that
the genre choice may be better explained by unobserved heterogeneous genre-specific
reading tastes. A noteworthy observation is that consumption across individual book
titles is highly dispersed; 92.8% of the book’s yearly sales were one, and even the
8E-commerce constituted 25.1%, 35.1%, and 43.8% of the U.S. trade book sales from 2010 to 2012,
respectively. The rest of the book sales came from oﬄine retailers such as large chain bookstores
and independent bookstores. Among book buyers, 44% have purchased books online.
9See http://ilmk.wordpress.com/category/analysis/snapshots/.
10The paperback wholesale price is $15, and the e-book wholesale price is $12. I impute the Kin-
dle costs from firms that release teardown reports almost every year (http://www.isuppli.com/
Teardowns/News/Pages/Amazon-Kindle-Fire-Costs-\$201-70-to-Manufacture.aspx). For
years without these reports, I extrapolated data by assuming that the cost drops at the same rate
as that of computer parts.
11Online e-book price trackers (e.g., tracker.kindlenationdaily.com) show that there was no sys-
tematic price change at the individual title level either. For print books, publishers generally use
new book editions to conduct dynamic pricing; they first launch hardcovers that are more expensive
and then launch paperbacks and mass market paperbacks. However, they do not dynamically price
a particular edition.
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Figure 1: Observed Kindle and E-Book Prices
Notes: The graph shows the observed Kindle prices (left y-axis) and observed average
e-book prices (right y-axis).
Figure 2: Book Price by Genre and Format
Notes: The graph shows the sales-unweighted prices. The curve for practical paperback
prices is scaled down by $10 to fit into the same graph.
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sample bestseller’s yearly sales were only 67 or 0.46% of the total yearly sales. The
long-tail sales distribution in the sample is comparable to the industrywide distribu-
tion. It suggests that a single book title is unlikely to drive the average book prices.
As for format, consumers’ choices seem to differ by genre. “Casual” books constitute
a disproportionally larger share in e-book format (71%) than in paperback format
(44%). For e-book buyers, with probability 76.9% they chose e-format for “lifestyle”
books, 96.4% for “casual” books, and 61.6% for “practical” books. There is strong
substitution between e-books and paperbacks in the same genre; 98.66% of the house-
holds bought a particular genre in at most one reading format. In terms of retailer,
Amazon’s market share increased from 32% in 2008 to 55% in 2012 at the expense of
the sales of other online retailers and oﬄine bookstores.
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CHAPTER 3
Model Setup
In this chapter, I first illustrate the pricing incentives using a simple two-period model
and then describe the full empirical model.
3.1. A Simple Two-Period Model
Consider a two-period model in which a firm sells durable primary hardware at price
P and complementary software at price pE to a unit mass of consumers. The hardware
serves as a gateway product to the software and does not bear any stand-alone value.12
Consumers are heterogeneous in their tastes for the software. The value of a unit of
the software v is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The utility of the hardware comes
from the utility generated by subsequent software consumption u = λ
(
v − pE)− P .
The coefficient λ is the quantity of the software.13 Consumers and the firm share
the same discount factor δ and live for two periods. The marginal costs are assumed
to be zero. The firm chooses software and hardware prices ~p1 =
{
pE1 , P1
}
and ~p2 ={
pE2 , P2
}
in periods 1 and 2. Consumers have rational expectations about the firm’s
12I relax this assumption and allow hardware to bear positive values in the full empirical model,
represented by quality dummies.
13In the full empirical model, the usage intensity λ is endogenized to be a function of the taste
parameter v and the book price pE . I assume that it is a constant here to keep the analytical solution
simple while illustrating the same qualitative results.
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pricing policies; their beliefs about prices are consistent with the firm’s strategy in
equilibrium. The marginal consumer in period 1, v∗1, is indifferent between buying
and waiting:
λ
[
v∗1 − pE1 + δ
(
v∗1 − pE2
)]− P1 = δ [λ (v∗1 − pE2 )− P2] > 0
where v∗1 =
P1−δP2
λ
+ pE1 . Consumers who buy hardware and software in period 1
are in the range [v∗1, 1]. Similarly, the marginal consumer in period 2, v
∗
2, satisfies
λ
(
v∗2 − pE2
) − P2 = 0, where v∗2 = P2λ + pE2 . Consumers who buy hardware and
consume software in period 2 are in the ranges [v∗2, v
∗
1] and [v
∗
2, 1], respectively.
This simple setup captures the main features of the traditional single-product
IPD as well as new features of IPD with complementary products. In particular,
the firm’s target is to first extract the most from high-valuation consumers on the
hardware and then appeal to low-valuation consumers while earning the most from
the software sales. As in the traditional IPD case, the firm faces a shrinking market
and lower average willingness-to-pay for the product over time; both the market size
and the consumer mix change. A decrease in P1 reduces the hardware demand in
period 2, changes the optimal P2, and in turn changes consumer expectations of P2 as
consumers’ beliefs are consistent with the optimal strategy. v∗1 summarizes the mass
of consumers remaining in the market at the beginning of period 2 and is the relevant
state variable for the pricing problem.
Three features are novel in the complementary product setup. First, consumers
are self-selected into buying the hardware based on their heterogeneous tastes for the
software. Second, the demands of the two products are interrelated. Consumers trade
off between the utility from a current hardware purchase and the value of waiting,
both of which further depend on the current and future software prices. Third, the
firm needs to coordinate the pricing of the two products. pE affects the profits from
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a hardware owner, while pE and P jointly affect the number of hardware owners.
The full model captures all the features of the simple model while allowing for richer
heterogeneity and nonlinear demand elasticities.
Using backward induction to solve for period 2 and period 1 prices, I get
~p2 (~p1) = arg max
~p2
pi2 = (1− v∗2)λpE2 + (v∗1 − v∗2)P2
~p1 = arg max
~p1
pi1 + δpi2 = (1− v∗1)
(
λpE1 + P1
)
+
λδ
4
(
1 +
1
δ
(
pE1 +
P1
λ
− 1
)2)
The optimal prices in period 2 are P ∗2 =
λ
2
and pE∗2 = 0. The optimal prices in
period 1 satisfy pE∗1 +
P ∗1
λ
= 1 + δ. In particular, P ∗1 = λ (1 + δ) and p
E∗
1 = 0 if λ > 1,
and P ∗1 = 0 and p
E∗
1 = 1 + δ if λ < 1.
The optimal strategies with complementary products differ from the harvesting
strategy in the traditional single-product IPD case in two ways. First, both harvesting
and investing can be optimal. If λ > 1, it is optimal to harvest on the hardware and
invest in the software. The opposite is true for λ < 1. Similarly in the full model, I
find that the firm should harvest on Kindles and invest in e-books for the avid readers
with high λ and should do the opposite for the general readers with low λ. Second,
the firm needs to coordinate pE and P . The optimal pricing condition pE∗1 +
P ∗1
λ
= 1+δ
indicates that the optimal P increases as pE decreases within the same period. The
results from the full model echo the results from this simple model.
3.2. Consumer Problem
In this section, I outline consumers’ discrete Kindle adoption/upgrading decisions and
continuous book purchase decisions. Consumers’ decision timing is shown in Figure
3. Every period, consumers first make ex-ante dynamic device decisions given the
current Kindle price and quality, book price and e-book availability, their beliefs on
the future values of these variables, and idiosyncratic device-side shocks. A consumer
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Figure 3: Consumer Decision Timing
who does not have a Kindle chooses to buy one or wait for the next period. The
benefit of becoming a Kindle owner is that in addition to buying paperbacks, he can
buy e-books that are potentially cheaper, more convenient to read, and become more
available over time. He needs to trade-off between the gain in discounted book flow
utilities from hereon and the one-time payment of the Kindle price. If he chooses
to wait, he cannot gain for now, but he can potentially get better Kindle prices
and qualities in the future. Kindle owners choose whether to upgrade to the latest
Kindle generation or wait. Upgrading is motivated by a higher Kindle quality and
does not affect their book purchases. Given their device-adoption statuses and the
idiosyncratic book-side shocks, consumers then make decisions in each genre about
book purchases (buy or not), format (paperback or e-book), and retailer (Amazon,
other online retailers, or oﬄine bookstores, conditional on buying paperbacks). They
never drop out of the market.
Consumers’ book consumption is modeled at the genre-format-retailer level in-
stead of book title level for two reasons. First, aggregate book sales are more relevant
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in the pricing problem compared with single title sales.14 Second, I do not have
title-level aggregate book sales data and cannot estimate title fixed effects to account
for price endogeneity issues. The benefit of modeling at the genre level is that the
average genre price is not endogenous to the quality of a particular book title in that
genre. I estimate genre fixed effects to capture average genre qualities. Section 4.2
provides more discussion on this.
I assume that consumers have persistent heterogeneous genre-specific book tastes.
They respond to time-varying book prices, availability, and idiosyncratic shocks by
adjusting their usage intensity or book quantities. Consumer taste segments are fixed,
while their device ownership distribution evolves endogenously over time. They have
perfect foresight on prices, Kindle quality, and book availability.15 Kindle launching
and book availability are taken from the data. Kindle qualities are taken as given
and estimated in the model. For years beyond the sample period from 2008 to 2012,
I assume that these variables stop evolving and stay at the year 2012 level.16 I also
make the following assumptions for tractability and data limitation reasons. First,
I assume that consumers read only e-books on e-readers and not on other screens
such as PCs and tablets; that is, they need to buy an e-reader before purchasing and
reading e-books. I conduct robustness checks by allowing consumers to buy or read
on other devices after 2010. The predictions on dynamic pricing are qualitatively
robust.17 Second, I assume that consumers use only one Kindle at a time and that
14Meanwhile, modeling at the title-level would require strong assumptions on the books that enter
consumers’ choice set. It is not appealing to assume that consumers must decide from the millions of
books that are available. It is also not appealing to assume that consumers consider only bestsellers,
as the majority of the book titles purchased were not bestsellers; 99.94% of the titles were purchased
less than 10 times in the data. Book consumption is much more dispersed than other content
products such as movies and video games.
15I assume perfect foresight because Amazon changed prices annually in the five-year period,
which leads to a short panel. I also try another rational expectation assumption for which consumer
exceptions follow an AR(1) process and the coefficients in the AR(1) model are empirically estimated.
The results are robust.
16As a validation of this assumption, Kindle prices experienced a significant drop from 2007 to
2011 and have remained in the $139-$199 range since 2011.
17In the first robustness check, I allow consumers to buy other reading devices in the demand
estimation. The estimated Kindle qualities are smaller, while the key demand-side results remain
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there is no resale value for Kindles. I also assume that Amazon offers one Kindle
version per period, which is the most popular version of the Kindle each period in
the data.18
Book quantity and format and paperback retailer choices. Consumers
choose book quantity and format in three genres by maximizing a quadratic direct
utility every period. If the consumer buys paperbacks, he decides whether to buy
from Amazon.com, other online retailers, or oﬄine bookstores. Index the three gen-
res, “lifestyle,” “casual,” and “practical,” by g = 1, 2, 3, respectively. Let subscript
i denote consumer type. Let superscript E and P denote e-books and paperbacks,
and let
{
pPgt, p
E
gt
}
denote their prices, respectively. Let superscript 0 denote Kindle
nonowners and let qP0igt denote their paperback quantity choices. Let superscript 1
denote Kindle owners, and let
{
qP1igt , q
E
igt
}
denote their paperback and e-book quantity
choices. A Kindle owner of type i maximizes his period utility from both paper-
backs and e-books, and a Kindle nonowner maximizes his period utility from only
paperbacks:
max
{qP1igt ,qEigt}g
ubook,1it = z +
∑
g
1
bi
(
aPigtq
P1
igt + a
E
igtq
E
igt −
(
qP1igt + q
E
igt
)2
2
)
s.t.
∑
g
(
pPgtq
P1
igt + p
E
gtq
E
igt
)
+ z 6 yi (3.1)
max
{qP0igt}g
ubook,0it = z +
∑
g
1
bi
(
aPigtq
P0
igt −
(
qP0igt
)2
2
)
s.t.
∑
g
pPgtq
P0
igt + z 6 yi
the same. In the second robustness check, I account for reading e-books on other devices by adding
book profits generated on other devices to Amazon’s profit function. I find that in this case, Amazon
has weaker incentives to set low e-book prices to induce Kindle adoption because some consumers
already own other devices. Yet the joint IPD strategy is not qualitatively changed.
18In practice, consumers are offered up to two generations of Kindles every year except for year
2012 when three generations were on the market. The most popular version comprised at least 70%
of the sales every year. Also, multiproduct firm pricing is computationally prohibitive. Goettler and
Gordon (2011) also make this single-product assumption for computational reasons.
23
Table 1: Optimal Book Quantity Solutions
Quantity choice Conditions Intuitions
Kindle owner:
{
qP1∗igt , q
E∗
igt
}
g
=
{0, 0} pPgt >
aPigt
bi
, pEgt >
aEigt
bi
Neither is worth buying.
pPgt <
aPigt
bi
, pEgt >
aEigt
bi
or Only paperback is worth buying,{
aPigt − bipPgt, 0
}
pPgt <
aPigt
bi
, pEgt <
aEigt
bi
, or both are worth buying, but
aPigt − bipPgt > aEigt − bipEgt paperback is more attractive.
pPgt >
aPigt
bi
, pEgt <
aEigt
bi
or Only e-book is worth buying,{
0, aEigt − bipEgt
}
pPgt <
aPigt
bi
, pEgt <
aEigt
bi
, or both are worth buying, but
aPigt − bipPgt < aEigt − bipEgt e-book is more attractive.
Kindle nonowner: qP0∗igt ={
aPigt − bipPgt
}
pPgt <
aPigt
bi
Paperback is worth buying.
{0} otherwise Paperback is not worth buying.
where aPigt and a
E
igt are heterogeneous book taste parameters. I parameterize them
later. bi can be interpreted as a heterogeneous price coefficient because it enters the
optimal quantity choice linearly in front of the price. z is the numeraire, and yi is
household income. The numeraire price is normalized to be 1. The optimal quantity
choices in each genre for owners and nonowners are summarized in Table 1.
The quadratic utility functional form has the following advantages compared
with the discrete choice logit utility or the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
utility: 1) it allows for multiple-unit and corner solutions (zero consumption) that are
common in book purchase patterns; and 2) the optimal quantity solution given this
utility form is a linear function of prices.19 The utility form I assume here implies
19More flexible quadratic utility specifications yield qualitatively the same demand-side predic-
tions, although the optimal quantity solutions are more complex. Economides, Seim, and Viard
(2008) adopt a similar quadratic functional form without allowing for substitution. For a nice sur-
vey on direct utility models of consumer choice in marketing, see Chandukala, Kim, Otter, Rossi,
and Allenby (2008).
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that utilities from different book genres do not interact and that there is perfect
substitution between paperbacks and e-books of the same genre.20 These properties
are consistent with observed book consumption patterns.
Once a consumer chooses to buy paperbacks, he decides among buying from
Amazon.com, other online retailers, or oﬄine bookstores. Sales of online retailers have
been growing steadily as part of the total retail sales even before the introduction of
e-books.21 I use a discrete choice logit structure to parsimoniously capture this trend
while allowing for e-reading to influence it. Denote the three retailers by A, B,
and O. The retailer utilities contain genre-specific retailer fixed effects and linear
time trends. It is uretailer,Aigt = A0g + A1g · t + A2 · 1 {owner} + ζAigt for Amazon,
uretailer,Bigt = B0g +B1g · t+ ζBigt for other online retailers, and uretailer,Oigt = ζOigt for oﬄine
bookstores. Oﬄine bookstores serve as the baseline choice, and its fixed effect and
time trend are normalized to zero.
{
ζAigt, ζ
B
igt, ζ
O
igt
}
are i.i.d. logit errors. In particular, I
allow Kindle ownership to affect the probability of buying paperbacks from Amazon,
which is captured by A2.
22 The retailer fixed effects help fit the observed retailer
market share. The time trends help fit the variation of the shares over time. A2 helps
capture Amazon’s incremental market share that occurred after the introduction of
Kindles and e-books.
Consumer heterogeneity. I parameterize the taste parameters to be func-
20By construction, this model specification cannot generate positive numbers of books bought for
both formats in the same genre. In the data set, only 1.34% of consumers buy positive quantities
of both formats. For these consumers, I assume that there are two shopping occasions in a period.
The observation
{
qP1igt , q
E
igt
}
is treated as two independent observations,
{
qP1igt , 0
}
and
{
0, qEigt
}
. This
would mildly overestimate the substitution between paperbacks and e-books.
21See http://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec\_current.pdf.
22I model this retailer choice as a separate decision from book quantity-format choice because I
observe that consumers who choose different retailers do not exhibit different quantity-format choice
patterns. It indicates that the two choices do not seem to interact. Alternatively, one can nest
the format-quantity choice inside the retailer choice as uretailerigt = v
book
it
(
pretailer
)
+ retailer FE +
time trend + ζigt, where the retailer utility contains the indirect book utility as a function of the
quantity-format choice and retailer-specific paperback prices. This specification is equivalent to my
case because the observed paperback prices are generally the same across retailers. It means that
the indirect book utility, vbookit , is the same for all retailers and will be canceled out in the retailer
choice probability. If the observed retailers’ prices are different or if the counterfactual simulation
requires changing the retailer paperback prices, the alternative specification can be of interest.
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tions of observed demographics, unobserved book reading tastes, and idiosyncratic
taste shocks:
aPigt = θig + β1D
age
i + η
P
igt (3.2)
aEigt = θig + β1D
age
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Baseline taste
+
(
θEg + β2D
age
i + β3 log n
E
t
) · 1 {ebook}︸ ︷︷ ︸
E-format taste
+ηEigt
First, the two formats in the same genre share the same baseline taste. Consumers are
heterogeneous in the genre-specific baseline taste or the genre fixed effect θig; some
might enjoy reading “casual” books, while others might enjoy reading “practical”
books. I model the baseline taste heterogeneity using a finite mixture specification.
Second, consumers have genre-specific e-format taste θEg ; some genres might be more
suitable for e-reading than others. The e-format taste can vary over time as the
number of e-books available increases.23 Both the baseline taste and e-format taste
can vary by age Dagei . Senior consumers generally read more books, are less tech-
savvy, and can have lower e-format tastes. Finally, consumers receive idiosyncratic
taste shocks ηigt that are assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed with mean zero
and standard deviation σ.24
Note that all the variables in the taste parameter aigt linearly affect book demand
because q∗igt = aigt − bipgt. For instance, consumers who have a higher unobserved
taste for “casual” books will buy more “casual” books. The price affects the demand
through bi. I allow the price coefficients to vary across income groups bi = b0 +
23The number of e-books available is taken as given from the data. It is not directly correlated
with e-reader userbase for two reasons. First, publishers’ e-book launching decisions hinge on their
concern about the impact of e-format on print format sales. They decide whether to launch the e-
book version on a title-by-title basis and change their launching strategy from time to time. Second,
unlike the video game industry, e-book introduction is often not retailer-exclusive. Amazon.com and
Barnesandnoble.com both had around three million e-books available by 2012, but their e-reader
userbases differed by five times. A caveat is that there is no aggregate shock in the model. The
e-book availability coefficient may capture some unobserved trend, if any, other than those retailer
time trends I have controlled for.
24In a robustness check, I allow ηPigt and η
E
igt to be correlated within the same genre. The implied
substitution patterns and price elasticities are very robust with respect to this specification change.
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b1D
income
i . The shocks ηigt in aigt can capture individual price and taste deviations
from the average price pgt and average taste of the type. In all, consumers differ in
their observed types {Dincomei , Dagei }, unobserved types θig, and idiosyncratic shocks
ηigt. The unobserved types and the observed types are independent. Consumers have
persistent unobserved genre-specific tastes θig. They respond to time-varying prices,
e-book availability, and idiosyncratic shocks by changing how many books to buy.
As shown in the estimation results later, the unobserved heterogeneous genre
fixed effect θig is the only difference between avid and general readers. It is the major
heterogeneity that drives the difference in consumer book and e-reader consumption
and helps fit the genre market share. Paperbacks and e-books differ in prices, con-
sumers’ format tastes, and taste shocks. Substitution between the two formats in
each genre is explained by the e-format genre fixed effects θEg and the format price
difference. Variation in the substitution patterns over time is mainly explained by
the time-varying e-book availability nEt .
Indirect flow utility from books. I can calculate the ex-ante indirect flow
utilities from books for Kindle nonowners and owners, vbook,0it and v
book,1
it , by substi-
tuting the optimal book quantities into the utility function and taking expectations
over the error terms ηigt in aigt:
vbook,0it = yi +
∑
g
E[
(
aPigt − bipPgt
)2
2bi
| qP0∗igt > 0] · Pr
(
qP0∗igt > 0
)
vbook,1it = yi +
∑
F={P,E}
∑
g
{
E[
(
aFigt − bipFgt
)2
2bi
| qF1∗igt > 0, q−F1∗igt = 0]
·Pr (qF1∗igt > 0, q−F1∗igt = 0)} (3.3)
Device adoption decision. Dynamically, given the utilities from books, con-
sumers decide ex ante whether to buy or upgrade their Kindles. Equation 3.4 shows
the flow utilities for a Kindle nonowner who chooses to wait, a Kindle owner who
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chooses to wait, and a consumer who chooses to buy/upgrade:
u¯0it = Γv
book,0
it + ε¯
0
it
u¯1it = Γv
book,1
it
(
pEt
)
+ Q¯it + ε¯
1
it (3.4)
uit = Γv
book,1
it
(
pEt
)
+Qt − α1Pt + εit
If a consumer does not have a Kindle and chooses to wait in this period, he receives
book utility only from paperbacks. If he has a Kindle and chooses not to upgrade,
he receives book utility from both paperbacks and e-books and the quality of his old
Kindle Q¯it. If a consumer chooses to buy/upgrade to the latest Kindle generation, he
receives book utility from both paperbacks and e-books plus the new Kindle quality
Qt at the cost of Kindle price Pt. The price coefficient αi = α0 +α1D
income
i is allowed
to vary across income groups. The idiosyncratic shocks {ε¯0it, ε¯1it, εit} are identically
and independently distributed extreme value type I errors, which are also independent
of the error terms on the book side. The variances are normalized to be 1.25 The
Kindle qualities are estimated as dummies. I do not allow them to interact with
book utilities because the data cannot identify such interaction. When adding Kindle
quality dummies into the book utility, the estimated dummies are insignificant. The
reason might be that, for instance, a Kindle owner who had a new Kindle in 2012
did not buy significantly different numbers of e-books compared with a Kindle owner
who had an old generation in 2008. I thus keep the Kindle qualities and book utilities
as additively separable in the device flow utility.
The flow utility enters the dynamic programming problem. To make the notation
more general, I use u¯it to jointly denote the flow utility of waiting for nonowner and
owner {u¯0it, u¯1it}. For a nonowner, Kindle quality is Q¯it = 0. For each consumer type,
25Another normalization approach is to drop the coefficient Γ and estimate the variance of the
error term. The two approaches are equivalent. The coefficient Γ is thus identified by the observed
variation in the Kindle adoption decisions, similar to how variance of the error term is identified in
the second normalization approach.
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the state space contains (1) the current Kindle ownership status Q¯it, which evolves
based on the device adoption choice; (2) the e-book price pEt , which enters the ex-ante
flow utility from books vbookit ; (3) the offered Kindle price Pt and quality Qt; and (4)
the idiosyncratic shocks on the device side ~εit ≡ {ε¯it, εit}. Let V
(
Q¯it, Qt, Pt, p
E
t , ~εit
)
denote the value function of a consumer with current device Q¯it at the beginning of
the period. dit = 1 indicates buying/upgrading and dit = 0 indicates waiting. The
Bellman equation is
V
(
Q¯it, Qt, Pt, p
E
t , ~εit
)
= max
{
u¯it + δE
[
V
(
Q¯it, Qt+1, Pt+1, p
E
t+1, ~εit+1
) | Qt, Pt, pEt , dit = 0] ,
uit + δE
[
V
(
Qt, Qt+1, Pt+1, p
E
t+1, ~εit+1
) | Qt, Pt, pEt , dit = 1]} (3.5)
The first and second elements of the max operator are the choice-specific value
functions of waiting and buying/upgrading. Conditional on waiting, the device adop-
tion status remains at Q¯it+1 = Q¯it. Conditional on buying/upgrading, the device
adoption status evolves deterministically as Q¯it+1 = Qt. The rest of the state space{
Qt, Pt, p
E
t
}
evolves to
{
Qt+1, Pt+1, p
E
t+1
}
, according to consumers’ expectation about
next period values h
(
Qt+1, Pt+1, p
E
t+1|Qt, Pt, pEt
)
. Let EV (·) = ∫
ε
V (·, ~ε) dg~ε denote
the expectation of the value function integrated over ~εit. The expected value function
is
EV
(
Q¯it, Qt, Pt, p
E
t
)
= ln
[
exp
(
u¯it − ε¯it + δE
[
V
(
Q¯it, Qt+1, Pt+1, p
E
t+1
) | Qt, Pt, pEt , dit = 0])
+ exp
(
uit − εit + δE
[
V
(
Qt, Qt+1, Pt+1, p
E
t+1
) | Qt, Pt, pEt , dit = 1]) ]
(3.6)
Notice that there is a unique expected value function for each type. The probability
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vector of buying/upgrading for each type is
φ
(
dit = 1 | Q¯it, Qt, Pt, pEt
)
=
A
A+B
A = exp
(
u¯it − ε¯it + δE
[
V
(
Q¯it, Qt+1, Pt+1, p
E
t+1
) | Qt, Pt, pEt , dit = 0])
B = exp
(
uit − εit + δE
[
V
(
Qt, Qt+1, Pt+1, p
E
t+1
) | Qt, Pt, pEt , dit = 1])
where each element in the vector represents the probability of adoption/upgrading
for consumer type i with current Kindle quality Q¯it.
The key feature of the demand system is that Kindle adoption is driven by usage
intensity of books, which is further endogenized to be a function of consumers’ book
tastes and book prices. In this sense, e-book prices affect Kindle attractiveness. The
book-side and device-side decisions are linked because (1) the ex-ante flow utilities
from books affect the Kindle adoption decisions; and (2) the Kindle adoption statuses
influence the book formats that consumers can choose from. Consumers are motivated
to buy Kindles for three reasons: the gain from current-period book utility, the current
device prices and qualities, and the option value of device adoption. To see this, take
the difference of the two choice-specific value functions:
{[
Γvbookit +Qt
]− [Γvbookit + Q¯it]}− αPt +
δ{E [V (Qt, Qt+1, Pt+1, pEt+1) | Qt, Pt, pEt , dit = 1]
−E [V (Q¯it, Qt+1, Pt+1, pEt+1) | Qt, Pt, pEt , dit = 0]}
The first term represents the increase in Kindle quality and, for a first-time device
adopter, the increase in book flow utility (vbookit changes from v
book,0
it to v
book,1
it ). The
second term indicates that consumers will respond to a Kindle price drop. The third
term is the option value, or the discounted utility gain from Kindles in the future.
Both the current and future gains drive consumers to self-select into buying Kindles.
30
We can expect that consumers who like reading benefit more from having Kindles
and will adopt earlier.
3.3. Firm Problem
I take a normative stance and estimate the demand system without assuming opti-
mality of the observed prices. Given Kindle costs and book wholesale prices from
industry reports, I use the estimated demand system to compute Amazon’s optimal
Kindle and e-book pricing strategies. The consumers’ and the firm’s dynamic prob-
lems are jointly solved in the simulation. The book wholesale prices are adjusted
by a calibrated spillover effect to Amazon’s other product business, so as to reflect
a more realistic marginal cost of selling books for Amazon.26 To keep the model
tractable, I make several simplifications from the demand model. First, I abstract
from the quality improvements to analyze IPD because I do not have data on R&D.
It is also computationally prohibitive to jointly solve for quality and pricing problems
with complementary products. Because quality improvements are often intertwined
with price changes, I use the average estimated quality in the pricing simulation.
Consumers have only two device ownership statuses: Kindle owner and nonowner.27
26I first impute the book wholesale prices from the standard pricing approach in the publishing
industry. The list price of e-books is 80% of the list price of paperbacks. Amazon sells books at
60% of the list price on average. The wholesale price for both paperbacks and e-books is 50% of the
list price. I use these rules and the observed Amazon paperback prices to back out the wholesale
prices, which are $15 for paperbacks and $12 for e-books. Yet the observed Amazon e-book price
is $9.72, and the simulation cannot generate such a low price level. The reasons might be that
there are unobserved factors that change Amazon’s actual marginal cost such as spillover effect
into Amazon’s other product business, negotiated quantity discounts that are not publicly observed,
and competition pressure. To get a more realistic marginal cost value, I allow for a spillover effect
per book transaction in the simulation. I solve the pricing problem with different magnitudes of
this spillover effect. The predictions on dynamic pricing are very robust, which can be regarded
as robustness checks on the value of the marginal cost I choose. I pick one value of the spillover
effect so that the simulated e-book price level is comparable to the observed one for just the first
period. Notice that this does not match the entire price path because I still take a normative view on
the dynamic pricing policy. I keep this spillover effect when reporting the pricing and profitability
results. Gentzkow (2007) adopts a similar approach when rationalizing the zero price of online
newspapers.
27The upgraders are modeled in a simplified way. They have proportionally higher book flow
utilities than first-time adopters. The proportion is calculated from the estimated demand system.
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Second, I restrict the pricing policy to be functions of only the two unobserved types
and average over the observed demographics types. This helps reduce the state space
greatly from 36 dimensions to two dimensions while keeping the major heterogene-
ity in consumer tastes that drives self-selection. Third, I do not distinguish between
book genres and solve for one e-book price as if changing book prices uniformly across
genres.
Amazon sets Kindle price P and e-book price pE to maximize its total dis-
counted profits from Kindles, print books, and e-books. The firm’s state space ∆
is a vector that contains the number of Kindle nonowners for each type at the be-
ginning of the current period, similar to v∗1 in the simple two-period model. The
demand system provides two key inputs to the firm’s pricing problem: (a) the prob-
abilities of adopting Kindles φt = {φit}i; (b) the book profits Amazon earns from
each Kindle owner r1it =
(
pEt − wE
) · qEi (pEt ) + (pP − wP ) · qP1Ait (pEt ) and nonowner
r0it =
(
pP − wP ) · qP0Ait , where {wP , wE} are the wholesale prices paid to publishers
and
{
qP1Ait , q
P0A
it
}
are the numbers of paperbacks sold on Amazon, which equal the
total number of paperbacks
{
qP1it , q
P0
it
}
times the probability of buying from Amazon
Pr
(
Amazon | qPit > 0, qEit = 0
)
. Let r1t = {r1it}i and r0t = {r0it}i. Let rgaint ≡ r1t − r0t
denote Amazon’s gain in book profits from converting a nonowner to an owner. Given
the consumer adoption probability φt, the number of nonowners in the next period
∆t+1 equals the probability of not buying/upgrading times the number of nonowners
in this period ∆t, which indicates that the state space evolves deterministically as
∆t+1 = [I − φt] ∆t. The Bellman equation of the firm is
EWt (∆t) = max
Pt,pEt
pit
(
Pt, p
E
t ,∆t
)
+ δE
[
Wt+1 (∆t+1) | Pt, pEt ,∆t
]
pit
(
Pt, p
E
t ,∆t
)
= piKindlet + pi
book,1
t + pi
book,0
t
where Kindle profits equal the number of new adopters times the Kindle mark-up
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piKindlet = (φt ·∆t) [Pt − ct] . Aggregate book profits from Kindle nonowners equal
the cumulative number of nonowners times the book profits generated per nonowner
pibook,0t = (I − φt) · ∆t · r0t . Aggregate book profits from Kindle owners equal the
cumulative number of owners times the book profits generated per owner pibook,1t =
(∆0 −∆t + φt ·∆t) · r1t , where ∆0 is the initial market size at period 0. Note that I
need to compute the value function for each period because the following variables
change over time: (1) Kindle cost ct, which affects pi
Kindle
t and is taken from the data;
and (2) consumer’s retailer choice probability Pr
(
Amazon | qPit > 0, qEit = 0
)
, which
affects {r0t , r1t } and changes over time based on the time trends in the retailer utility.
Same as in the demand model, I assume that these variables stop evolving and remain
at the year 2012 level to keep the problem stationary.
Taking the F.O.C. with respect to the Kindle price yields
∆t · ∂φt
∂Pt
[Pt − ct] + φt ·∆t︸ ︷︷ ︸
static Kindle profit change
+ ∆t · ∂φt
∂Pt
· rgaint︸ ︷︷ ︸
static book profit change
−∆t · ∂φt
∂Pt
· δ∂Wt+1 (∆t+1)
∂∆t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
dynamic future state change
= 0(3.7)
The first-order condition informs the trade-offs for Kindle pricing. Statically, the
firm needs to get a greater number of Kindle owners (affected by
{
pEt , Pt
}
) and earn
higher profits from each owner (affected by pEt ). A higher Kindle price increases the
marginal gain on the existing Kindle sales (the first term) at the cost of the gains from
new adopters (the second term) and their associated book profits (the third term).
The demand elasticities dictate the magnitudes of these effects. Dynamically, two
effects are captured in the fourth term: (1) a higher current Kindle price reduces the
market size and changes the future mix of the two consumer types; and (2) the current
prices today affect consumers’ expectation over future prices, which in turn affects
current adoption. The firm needs to tradeoff between static and dynamic incentives
and optimally manage the size and mix of owners as well as profits per owner. Taking
the F.O.C. with respect to the e-book prices yields the following equation with similar
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trade-offs:
∆t · ∂φt
∂pEt
· rgaint + [∆0 −∆t + φt ·∆t] ·
∂rgaint
∂pEt︸ ︷︷ ︸
static book profit change
+
∆t · ∂φt
∂pEt
[Pt − ct]︸ ︷︷ ︸
static Kindle profit change
−∆ · ∂φt
∂pEt
· δ∂Wt+1 (∆t+1)
∂∆t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
dynamic future state change
= 0 (3.8)
I consider the pure-strategy Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) in which
both consumers and the firm are forward-looking. The noncommitment pricing policy
is subgame perfect in that prices are optimal given the state of the market in any
period.28 The setup is similar to the frameworks in Nair (2007) and Goettler and
Gordon (2011). The equilibrium requires that the consumer’s expectation over the
future state is consistent with the firm’s optimal strategy.29 The equilibrium is defined
as the set
{
V ∗,W ∗, P ∗, pE∗, h∗
}
, which contains the equilibrium value functions for
the consumers and the firm, the optimal pricing policy functions for Kindles and
e-books, and the beliefs about next period state space.30
28I consider noncommitment policies because “policies with commitment are not generally sub-
game perfect” and “the firm has an incentive to deviate from the announced policy after the initial
period passes” (Besanko and Winston, 1990). Noncommitment policies are “more managerially
relevant” (Nair, 2007).
29Consumer rational expectation assumption is common in dynamic equilibrium models. On
the theoretical side, such “relatively simple equilibrium policies are effective in explaining the key
qualitative features of the data” (Nair, 2007). In practice, the prices of digital durable goods such as
iPhones drop in a regular manner. Many online websites (e.g., decide.com) also provide consumers
with price drop predictions based on historical prices, which further enhance consumers’ ability to
predict price change.
30When solving for the equilibrium, I need to jointly solve the consumers’ and the firm’s dynamic
problems. In equilibrium, the Kindle price P = P (∆) and the e-book price pE = pE (∆) are
functions of the state space. In the simulation, it is useful to rewrite the consumer’s problem with
∆ in the state space instead of P and pE . The simplifications on the supply side (e.g., book prices
change uniformly across genres) apply on the demand side as well.
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CHAPTER 4
Demand Estimation and Supply
Simulation Method
This chapter constructs the likelihood function based on the demand model and
discusses identification, demand estimation, and supply simulation strategies.
4.1. Likelihood Function
The total log likelihood is composed of probabilities of the individual-level device and
book choice observations, as well as aggregate oﬄine book sales L = LKindle+Lbook +
Laggregate.
On the device side, the device choice gives the conditional probability of buy-
ing/upgrading conditional on holding Kindle version Q¯it. It is φ
(
dit = 1 | Q¯it, Qt, Pt, pEt
)
or φ
(
di = 1 | Q¯it, t
)
, as
{
Q,P, pE
}
are unique per period. The conditional prob-
ability of buying/upgrading further implies the probabilities of holding a particu-
lar Kindle generation at time t, Pr
(
Q¯it | t
)
. Combining these two probabilities,
I can calculate the unconditional probabilities of buying/upgrading every period
Pr (di = 1 | t) =
∑
Q¯it
φ
(
di = 1 | Q¯it, t
)
Pr
(
Q¯it | t
)
. The device part of the log likeli-
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hood function for each consumer type is
LKindlei =
2012∑
t=2008
[ni1t log [Pr (di = 1 | t)] + ni0t log [1− Pr (di = 1 | t)]]
Here ni1t is the observed Kindle sales from type i at time t, and ni0t = Ni0−ni1t is the
observed number of waiting decisions. Ni0 is the number of type i consumers in the
initial market. Summing over the observed types and integrating over the unobserved
types, I can obtain the total device-side log likelihood function LKindle.
On the book side, the individual-level probabilities of book quantity, format, and
paperback retailer choices are combined to form the likelihood Lbook. For instance, a
Kindle owner i buys q paperbacks from Amazon and zero e-book in genre g at time
t. The probability of this observation is
f
(
qPigt = q > 0, q
E
igt = 0
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
format=P, quantity=q
Pr
(
Amazon | qPigt > 0, qEigt = 0
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
retailer=Amazon
Taking log and summing over all the observations for each individual every period, I
can obtain the total book-side log likelihood function Lbook.
Finally, I match the model-predicted aggregate oﬄine book sales Hˆgt (Ω) to the
observed ones in the data Hgt. Given parameter values Ω, I simulate the error terms in
the taste parameter
{
ηPigt, η
E
igt
}
10,000 times and calculate the predicted oﬄine book
quantity for individual i in genre g at time t. Summing over the individual quantities,
I obtain the predicted aggregate oﬄine book sales Hˆgt (Ω). The set of simulated error
terms is fixed throughout the estimation to keep the problem stationary. Following
Allen, Clark, and Houde (2014), I calculate the probability of observing Hˆgt (Ω) using
the central-limit theorem. The null hypothesis is that the model is correctly specified
so that Hˆgt (Ω)−Hgt is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2gt, where
σ2gt is the predicted variance of Hˆgt (Ω). The likelihood of the aggregate moments
36
is thus Laggregate =
∑
g,t log
1
σgt
φ
[(
Hˆgt (Ω)−Hgt
)
/σgt
]
, where φ (·) is the PDF of
standard normal distribution. The device-side, book-side, and aggregate moment
likelihood jointly form the total log likelihood L = LKindle + Lbook + Laggregate.
4.2. Identification
The book-side parameters include taste parameters
{
θig, θ
E
g , β1, β2 , β3, σ
}
, retailer
fixed effects and time trends, and price coefficient bi. I can group them as time-
invariant (fixed effects) and time-variant (prices, e-book availability, and time trends).
The genre fixed effects in the baseline taste θig are captured by a finite mixture model
and are identified from the genre market shares. The genre fixed effects in the e-
format taste θEg are identified from the substitution patterns between paperbacks and
e-books. Variation in the substitution patterns over time identifies the coefficient on
time-varying e-book availability β3. The coefficients on age β1 and β2 are identified
from the consumption patterns across age groups. The retailer fixed effects and time
trends are identified from retailer market share and its variation over time. The rest
of the variation is explained by price. In particular, the price coefficient bi is identified
from the variation in book prices across genres, formats, and over time. The price
variation over time is small and comes from exogenous changes in, for instance, the
mix of book titles and the institutional pricing arrangements. A larger price variation
comes from the difference between paperback and e-book prices across genres. In the
model, I control that paperbacks and e-books in the same genre share the same
persistent genre baseline taste. This helps identify the price coefficient.31
31If there were only two genres and prices are constant over time, the genre fixed effects in the
baseline taste θig and the genre fixed effects in the e-format taste θ
E
g would capture all the difference
among the four genre-format combinations, leaving no variation to identify the price coefficient. In
my model, there are three genres and the two formats in the same genre share the same baseline
taste θig. Besides, p
P
gt − pEgt differs by genre. This imposes extra restrictions on the parameters
so that the price coefficient is identified (even without price variation over time). The change in
pPgt − pEgt over time provides further identification sources.
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The device-side parameters include
{
Γ, αi, {Qt}t=2012t=2008
}
. The coefficient on book
utility Γ is cross-sectionally identified from the different device adoption probabili-
ties of consumers given the same Kindle price and quality. The price coefficient αi
and Kindle quality dummies {Qt}t=2012t=2008 are jointly identified from two sources: (1)
cross-sectionally, the different adoption/upgrading probabilities of consumers owning
different Kindle versions; and (2) intertemporally, the adoption/upgrading probabil-
ities for each consumer type. They are separately identified, as price is incurred
only once and quality enters utility every period. I assume that the Kindle qual-
ity evolves according to a Markov process {xn} with a degenerate transition matrix.
The transition probability is p (xn+1 = Qt+1|xn = Qt) = 1 for t = 2008 to 2011 and
p (xn+1 = Q2012|xn = Q2012) = 1. To avoid overfitting, I capture the values of the
qualities using Qt = Q0 +Q1 log t.
Since the book side and the device side are linked by consumers’ self-selection
process, many parameters are identified from both sides. For instance, the taste
parameters and price coefficient on the book side enter book utility and in turn device
utility, so they are also identified from device adoption choices. The income-specific
price coefficients and age-specific taste coefficients are identified by both the observed
book purchases and the observed Kindle adoption patterns across income-age groups.
Upgrading can be identified by observing how e-book sales change as Kindle sales
change. In a world without upgrading, additional Kindle sales (times the number of
e-books bought per Kindle owner) directly yield additional e-book sales. In a world
with upgrading, additional Kindle sales that come from upgrading do not lead to
additional Kindle owners and thus do not yield additional e-book sales. Furthermore,
the demographics of Kindle buyers over time offer clues about returning consumers.
Without upgrading, the change in the demographic composition should be monotonic
as the consumer pool is exhausted. Upgraders can be identified if the income and age
distribution of the Kindle adopters in the later years are similar to that in the early
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years.
Price endogeneity. The demand estimation is conducted without imposing
pricing optimality conditions. The observed prices might be endogenized to unob-
served qualities and demand shocks. The model setup helps eliminate the price endo-
geneity issue. First, to account for the fact that Kindle prices might be endogenous
to their qualities, I explicitly model and estimate the qualities of different Kindle
generations. Second, I model book consumption at the genre level instead of at the
book-title level. The price of a particular book title might be endogenous to its qual-
ity, which in turn affects its sales. In the model, I use the average genre price, which
is not endogenous to the qualities of individual book titles in that genre. In other
words, a single book title does not drive the average genre price.32 The genre quali-
ties are estimated as fixed effects in the model. Finally, prices are not endogenous to
demand fluctuations over time.
To ensure that best sellers do not drive average genre prices in the data, I tabulate
the sales of the book titles per year. It turns out that 92.82% of the book titles had
only one purchase record, 5.53% had two purchases, and 99.94% had less than 10
purchases. The consumption is highly dispersed. This pattern holds for all genres
and reading formats. The title with the highest sales was bought 67 times among
14,524 total book transactions in that year. This is comparable to the ratio of the
best sellers’ sales to the total trade volume in the industry. The sales-weighted and
unweighted prices on average differ only by 2%, and one of them is not systematically
higher or lower than the other. I conduct robustness checks by estimating the model
using both sales-weighted and unweighted prices.33 The results are quite robust.
32A single book title is not likely to drive consumers’ device choice, either. Unlike in the video
game and console market, consumers can always buy a title in paperback format, while they cannot
play games without buying the console. Furthermore, e-books are mostly not exclusive to retail
platforms. Amazon and Barnesandnoble.com have a comparable number of e-books available, while
many video games are exclusive to particular consoles.
33Thanks to Song Yao for suggesting this robustness check.
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4.3. Estimation and Computational Methods
To estimate the demand model, I use the Nested Fixed Point algorithm (NFXP) pro-
posed by Rust (1987). For each iteration, I solve the dynamic programming problem
for each consumer type in the inner loop and use MLE in the outer loop. Given
a set of parameter guesses, I first calculate the book-side probabilities and the flow
utilities from books. I then feed the flow utilities to the device side and solve the
dynamic programming problem using the value function iteration method. The flow
utilities and expected value functions are calculated separately for the 36 consumer
types (three age groups times three income groups times four unobserved segments on
book tastes). In particular, the value functions need to be calculated for consumers
holding different generations of Kindles. Given the value functions, I can construct
the device-side probabilities and form the total likelihood function.
To solve for the supply-side pricing problem, note that the equilibrium requires
that (1) consumers and the firm make optimal decisions, and that (2) consumer’s
expectation over the future state is consistent with the firm’s optimal strategy. The
computation algorithm includes an inner loop and an outer loop, which I detail in
the appendix. In the inner loop, Condition (1) requires that consumers solve their
maximization problems given their beliefs about next period state space and firm’s
policy functions. The firm then uses the consumers’ choices to update next period
state space and solve their policy functions again. Condition (2) requires that I repeat
this process until the optimal policy functions and the next period states reach a fixed
point. Given the fixed point, the outer loop updates the value function guesses and
iterates until convergence.
Function approximations are used in the demand estimation and supply simula-
tion. First, calculating the device choice probability requires calculating the indirect
utilities from books vbook,1it and v
book,0
it , which contain conditional expectations of a
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truncated normal error and its quadratic term. For vbook,1it , the truncation point is a
result of a max operator. I use Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 10 nodes to calculate
the conditional expectations. The format-quantity choice probability also involves
the probability of a truncated normal error in which the truncation point is a result
of a maximization operator. There is no closed-form expression for it. I use Gauss-
Chebychev quadrature with 10 nodes and Gauss-Laguerre quadrature with 10 nodes
to approximate the integrals. The details are presented in the appendix. Second, sev-
eral demand-side variables enter the supply-side problem: the probability of adopting
Kindles φ and the book profits generated per Kindle owner r1 and nonowner r0. They
are functions of Kindle price P and e-book price pE. I evaluate them on a set of grid
points for P and pE given the estimated demand system. I then approximate these
variables as functions of P and pE using splines.34 Third, I discretize the state space
into 20 grid points along each dimension. The value functions are approximated us-
ing cubic splines by interpolating between the grid points so that the functions are
differentiable when computing the firm’s first-order conditions.
34I try both linear splines and cubic splines. Linear splines with 11 breakpoints provide better
approximation. This is because the functions are highly linear with little local curvatures and level
off as P and pE increase. Cubic splines produce small fluctuations around the steady value, which
make the derivatives inaccurate. The accuracy of the derivatives is important when solving for the
firm’s first-order conditions. Therefore, I use linear splines to approximate the functions.
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CHAPTER 5
Demand-Side Estimation Results
This chapter presents the model fit and discusses the demand estimates and their
implications.
5.1. Model Fit
I first present the model fit of both Kindle and book sales at the aggregate level.
Table 2 displays the observed and predicted Kindle cumulative sales as a percentage
of total market size over time. Figure 4 compares the observed and predicted book
sales for both paperbacks and e-books by book genre and by retailer over time. The
demand model is estimated using data from 2008 to 2012. Data in 2013 are used as
an out-of-sample fit test. The model fits the aggregate-level Kindle and book sales
and the trend for each book format, genre, and retailer well.
At the individual level, model predictions can also be validated using survey
data. The Pew Research Center conducted surveys in February 2012 and reported
that e-reader nonowners bought seven books and owners bought 12 books in the
past 12 months. According to the model prediction in Table 4, avid readers’ book
consumption increases from 12.16 books to 18.26 books once they become a Kindle
owner, while general readers’ book consumption increases from 1.01 books to 4.96
books. The model predicts that 40% of Kindle owners were avid readers and that 60%
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Table 2: Model Fit: Cumulative Kindle Sales/Total Market Size (%)
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Observed 0.41 1.36 3.54 6.84 10.34 14.54
Predicted 0.30 1.40 4.02 7.51 11.41 15.73
Standard Error (0.15) (0.22) (0.32) (0.46) (0.90) (1.29)
were general readers by 2012. Overall, the model predicts that a typical Kindle owner
buys 7.5 books before and 12.7 books after adopting the device.35 These numbers are
comparable to the survey results. Both the aggregate-level and individual-level model
fits indicate that the model is able to recover the values of different book formats and
retailers, as well as the values of device adopting and waiting.
5.2. Parameter Estimates
Parameter interpretations. Table 3 reports the parameter estimates. Note that
the values of the estimated genre fixed effects θig and e-format fixed effects θg can
be interpreted as number of books because they linearly enter consumers’ book taste
parameters as aigt = θig + β1D
age
i +
(
θEg + β2D
age
i + β3 log n
E
t
) · 1 {ebook} + ηigt and
optimal quantity choice as q∗igt = aigt − bipgt.
The estimates on the baseline tastes show that consumers are highly heteroge-
neous in their unobserved genre-specific reading tastes, which is captured by a finite
mixture structure.36 The data reveal four segments. Segments 1, 2, and 3 repre-
sent consumers who have high reading tastes for “casual” books, for “lifestyle” and
“practical” books, and for all books respectively. They constitute 3.88% of the total
35According to the model estimation, (1) 7.5% of the population are avid readers and 92.5%
are general readers, and (2) 38% of avid readers and 2.2% of general readers own a Kindle by
2012. Combining the above estimates, the percentage of Kindle owners who are avid readers equals
(7.5%*38%)/(7.5%*38%+92.5%*2.2%)=58% and 100%-58%=42% for general readers. This means
that a typical Kindle owner, based on the model prediction, buys 12.16*58%+1.01*42%=7.5 books
before buying a Kindle and 18.26*58%+4.96*42%=12.7 books after adopting one.
36I determine the number of segments by incrementally adding segments until one of the segment
sizes is not statistically different from zero. Besanko, Dube´, and Gupta (2003) and Nair (2007) have
taken a similar approach. For each genre, I am able to identify two taste levels: high and low. A
complete combination of three genres and two levels leads to six types. The estimated segment sizes
are significantly different from zero for four out of the six types.
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Figure 4: Model Fit: Books
Notes: Observed values are indicated with solid lines, and predicted values are indicated
with dashed lines. 95% confidence intervals are shaded. For Graphs 2-4, the lines from top
to bottom are sales for Amazon paperbacks, other online retailer paperbacks, and Amazon
e-books.
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates
Book Lifestyle: g = 1 Casual: g = 2 Practical: g = 3
Baseline FE
θig: High 10.66*** 11.81*** 12.25***
(0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0188)
θig: Low 1.858*** 1.769*** 4.414***
(0.0066) (0.0139) (0.0059)
E-format FE
θEg 0.9220*** 2.755*** -1.210***
(0.1070) (0.0494) (0.0134)
Retailer FE & time trends
A0g -0.4162*** -0.7696*** -0.4627***
(0.0091) (0.0117) (0.0171)
A1g (time) 0.1491*** 0.1380*** 0.2615***
(0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0015)
B0g -1.529*** -0.9441*** -1.6203***
(0.0065) (0.0101) (0.0108)
B1g (time) 0.0198*** 9.317e-4*** 0.1368***
(0.0002) (2.003e-5) (0.0133)
Consumer segment tastes and sizes
Segment Genre baseline FE Population mass
{θig}g=1,2,3 {mi}i
1 low, high, low 0.0244***
(0.0021)
2 high, low, high 0.0141***
(0.0015)
3 high, high, high 0.0003
(0.0024)
4 low, low, low 1−m1 −m2 −m3
Device Book
α0 0.0048*** b0 0.2300*** β1 0.1027***
(0.0002) (0.0026) (0.0020)
α1 -1.003e-4*** b1 -0.0074*** β2 -3.925e-4***
(5.040e-6) (0.0017) (1.523e-5)
Γ 13.77*** σ 2.119*** β3 0.0050***
(0.3467) (0.0054) (0.0002)
Q0 -1.068*** A2 0.6515***
(0.0647) (0.0267)
Q1 0.3429***
(0.0458)
MLE Obj. 145,127 # Obs 89,382
Notes: ***, **, * represent significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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population, or 7.47% of the book buyers. Segment 4 represents consumers who have
low tastes for all genres. The first three segments are much closer along key dimen-
sions of interest such as demand elasticities and device adoption probabilities. For
the remainder of the discussion, I refer to the first three segments as “avid readers”
and the fourth segment as “general readers.” The estimated genre fixed effects imply
that an avid reader buys 8.9 more books than a general reader on average every year.
The coefficients on observed income and age imply that older consumers enjoy read-
ing more and that consumers in higher income groups have lower price elasticities of
Kindles and books.
The estimates on the e-format tastes show that consumers’ format preferences
and substitution patterns between paperbacks and e-books vary across book genres.
The estimated e-format genre fixed effects show that if there were no price differences
between the two formats, the same consumer would buy 0.92 more “lifestyle” books,
2.76 more “casual” books, and 1.21 fewer “practical” books in e-format in comparison
with his paperback consumption. It means that consumers enjoy extra utilities from
reading “lifestyle” and “casual” books in e-format and face disutilities from reading
“practical” books in e-format.37 Consequently, their substitution patterns between
formats differ across genres. I find that “casual” e-books have a lower own-elasticity
and a higher cross-elasticity with respect to paperbacks, indicating that they are
stronger substitutes for paperbacks. For other coefficient estimates, I find that older
consumers dislike the e-format and that e-book variety positively affects e-format
attractiveness.
Finally, the paperback retailer choice estimates show that consumers are mi-
grating from oﬄine to online, and from other online retailers to Amazon.com. One
37A caveat is that I cannot rule out the possibility that the e-format fixed effects partially capture
different e-book availability across genres. The number of e-books available in the data is aggregate
and not genre-specific. If the e-book format is more available in one genre than in another, it can be
absorbed by the e-format genre fixed effects. Still, the fixed effects could capture genre differences
for utility-related reasons such as different requirements on image display and depth of reading.
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interesting finding is that there is positive correlation between Kindle ownership and
Amazon retailer choice. I find that a Kindle owner has 54.8% probability of buying
paperbacks from Amazon conditional on buying, while the probability is 39.4% for a
Kindle nonowner. This could be either a spillover effect (i.e., state dependence) or
brand loyalty (i.e., unobserved persistent preference for Amazon).
Consumer heterogeneity. Consumers in the model are heterogeneous in
their unobserved baseline reading tastes θig and observed demographics such as in-
come and age. The estimates show that the unobserved heterogeneity leads to a much
larger difference in demand elasticities and consumption patterns than the observed
heterogeneity does. I thus focus on the distinction between avid readers and general
readers for the rest of the analysis.
Table 4 compares the demand elasticities and consumption behaviors of a typical
avid reader and a typical general reader given average observed prices.38 I find that
avid readers have higher probabilities of adopting Kindles and buying them earlier.
Their predicted Kindle penetration rate (38%) was higher than general readers’ (2.2%)
by the end of 2012. I also find that both avid readers and general readers buy more
books after adopting Kindles. A typical avid reader buys 12.16 paperbacks per year
before adopting a Kindle and buys 3.31 paperbacks and 14.95 e-books once he adopts
the e-reader. A typical general reader buys 1.01 paperbacks before adopting a Kindle
and buys 0.66 paperbacks and 4.30 e-books once he adopts the e-reader.
The key demand-side finding that drives the supply-side pricing strategy is the
relative demand elasticities between Kindles and books for avid and general readers.
I find that avid readers have lower price elasticities for both Kindles and e-books than
general readers in absolute terms, yet they are relatively more price elastic to e-book
prices than to Kindle prices. General readers are more price elastic to Kindle prices
38The demand elasticities of books I find are comparable to extant literature on book consumption
(e.g., Chevalier and Goolsbee, 2003; Ghose, Smith, and Telang, 2006; De los Santos, Hortac¸su, and
Wildenbeest, 2012; Reimers and Waldfogel, 2014).
47
Table 4: Consumer Heterogeneity in Kindle and Book Purchases
Avid reader General reader
Segment size 7.5% 92.5%
Demand elasticity
Kindle -1.41 (0.722) -6.01 (1.711)
E-book -0.40 (0.003) -0.77 (0.006)
Ratio: Kindle/E-book 3.53 7.81
Book consumption per person per year
Kindle nonowner: # paperbacks qP0 12.16 (0.002) 1.01 (0.004)
Kindle owner: # paperbacks qP1 3.31 (0.057) 0.66 (0.007)
Kindle owner: # e-books qE 14.95 (0.138) 4.30 (0.078)
Gain from converting a nonowner to an owner
for the industry
(
pP qP1 + pEqE
)− pP qP0 $-10.98 (0.345) $35.69 (0.652)
for Amazon
[(
pP − wP ) qP1A + 0.3pEqE] $35.67 (0.321) $12.46 (0.219)
− (pP − wP ) qP0A
Cannibalization: # books qP0 − qP1 8.85 (0.592) 0.35 (0.006)
Cannibalization rate (%):
(
qP0 − qP1) /qE 59.2 (0.168) 8.1 (0.043)
Notes: The values are calculated using the average observed prices across years. Standard
errors are in parentheses. The e-book price is pE = $9.72, the paperback price is pP =
$17.66, and the wholesale price is wP = $15. The gain from converting a nonowner to an
owner is calculated for the analysis in Chapter 7.
than to e-book prices. The intuition is that avid readers buy more books and spend
more on books than on devices relative to general readers. Consequently, they care
more about subsequent book purchases when considering buying Kindles.
Note that avid readers and general readers differ only in their baseline reading
tastes θig. They do not differ in the price coefficient. The difference in θig drives
their difference in book usage intensity, device adoption probability, relative demand
elasticity between the two products, and in turn optimal dynamic pricing strategies
for the firm. The difference in avid readers’ and general readers’ relative demand
elasticities is a result of their endogenous choices rather than being directly specified
by the model.
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CHAPTER 6
Supply-Side Policy Simulations
Given the estimated demand system, I numerically solve for Amazon’s optimal IPD
policies with complementary products. I begin by discussing how the existence of the
complementary product affects the IPD of the primary product. I hold the comple-
mentary product price flat and solve for the optimal IPD strategy for the primary
product only. This is comparable to the traditional single-product IPD case and helps
illustrate the novelty of the complementary product setting. I then allow the firm to
conduct IPD on both the primary and the complementary products. I show that the
firm can benefit from a joint IPD policy by exploiting a new dimension of consumer
heterogeneity.
There are two note-worthy points. First, I define harvesting and investing based
on mark-ups because cost can drop and drive down prices. Firms adopt a harvesting
(investing) strategy if the mark-up decreases (increases) over time. Notice that prices
can still drop when firms adopt an investing strategy if costs drop faster than prices.
Second, the book price I solve is the average price level across book titles. In practice,
firms can induce the change in average price through adjusting individual book title
prices.
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6.1. IPD on the Primary Product Only
In this section, I solve for the optimal IPD policy on the primary product, holding
the complementary product price exogenously fixed and flat. Compared with the
traditional IPD literature, some results are consistent and some are novel in this set-
ting. In particular, the firm loses more from consumers’ strategic behaviors, although
complementarity can enhance the firm’s IPD ability on the primary product.
First, complementarity provides extra investing incentives to the firm. The op-
timal pricing policy is investing rather than harvesting as in the traditional IPD
literature. Given the observed e-book price of $9.72, the optimal Kindle price drops
from $371 in 2008 to $249 in 2012. The markup increases from $135 to $160, sug-
gesting an investing strategy. The incentive to penetrate the market early outweighs
the incentive to skim high-valuation consumers.
Second, complementarity influences the firm’s IPD ability on the primary prod-
uct by changing the demand elasticities of the primary product. In particular, a lower
e-book price increases the difference in the demand elasticities of Kindles between the
two consumer types. This enhances the firm’s IPD ability so that the firm can invest
less in Kindles. When the e-book price decreases from $9.94 to $9.63, the optimal
Kindle price path shifts up, and the average price increases from $292 to $305.
Third, it is worth noting that the profit loss from consumers’ forward-looking
behavior is higher in the complementary product setting. Traditional single-product
IPD literatures conclude that profits and prices are higher if consumers are myopic
and do not intertemporally arbitrage. For instance, Nair (2007) studies IPD for
video games and finds that the profit under myopic consumers is 172.2% higher than
that under forward-looking consumers. This number is 284% in my case because the
difference in profits comes from not only the primary product sales but also from the
subsequent complementary product sales. The optimal price is higher under myopic
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consumers. It drops from $470 to $358 if consumers are myopic and drops from $371
to $249 if consumers are forward-looking.
6.2. IPD on Both Products
In this section, I solve for the optimal joint IPD policies on both products (hereon,
the joint IPD case).
I find that the shapes of the optimal pricing functions differ for avid readers
and general readers. This result is driven by the heterogeneity in relative demand
elasticities, which is novel in the complementary product setting. Optimal policies
are functions of the penetration rates of consumer types as shown in Figure 5. As
the penetration rate of avid readers increases, the optimal strategy is to harvest on
Kindles and invest in e-books. The opposite is true for general readers.39 In general, it
is optimal to invest in the product with higher relative demand elasticities and harvest
on the product with lower relative demand elasticities.40 Avid readers are more price
elastic to e-books than to Kindles. The opposite is true for general readers. The
joint IPD policy exploits this new dimension of consumer heterogeneity. The overall
price path balances the incentives for both consumer types and depends on the mix
of consumers in the market.
I use the optimal pricing functions to simulate the price trajectories and market
outcomes. The predicted price trajectory is to harvest on Kindles and invest in e-
books as shown in Table 5 under specification (i). The predicted e-book price increases
39Notice that consumer types are still unobserved to the firm. This result is a characteristic of
the policy functions, which are functions of the number of consumers in each type.
40This result is comparable to the static third-degree price discrimination problem, where con-
sumer types are observable (e.g., Aguirre et al., 2010). Compared with the nondiscriminatory case,
prices are lower in the weak market, where the demand is more price sensitive, and higher in the
strong market. I study IPD when consumer types are unobserved. The results can still be qual-
itatively applied to the scenario with observed consumer types (e.g., firms know consumer types
from transaction history or surveys). Based on the results, the firm should provide promotions on
Kindles to general readers and promotions on e-books to avid readers. Dynamic pricing is no longer
necessary in this case; the firm can charge a flat optimal price for each type.
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Figure 5: Policy Functions: Investing vs. Harvesting
by 11.1% over five years. To implement the e-book price increase in practice, Amazon
can frame the low initial prices as introductory prices. I compare the results to a single
IPD case in which the firm conducts IPD only on Kindles and optimally commits to
a fixed e-book price.41 The predicted price trajectory in the single IPD case is to
invest in Kindles. Amazon should start with a relatively smaller mark-up for Kindles
and gradually increase it over time. The retail price still drops over time as the cost
drops faster. The joint IPD policy induces faster-declining Kindle prices and lower
penetration rates of both avid readers and general readers.
The joint IPD policy, as compared with the single IPD policy, benefits the firm
in two ways. First, it offers the firm a better screening device and induces a higher
fraction of avid readers, who are more profitable, to adopt Kindles as shown in Figure
6. To see how the screening device works, consider two scenarios. With only one
product, raising the price will discourage both avid readers and general readers from
buying; they respond in the same direction. With two products, raising the Kindle
price and reducing the e-book price properly will attract avid readers and discourage
41I do not examine how Amazon gets commitment power. In practice, commitment power can
come from reputation (e.g., Apple’s strategy on hardware) or contractual arrangement (e.g., resale
price maintenance).
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Table 5: IPD on Both Products vs. IPD on the Primary Product Only
(i) (ii)
Single IPD Joint IPD Single IPD Joint IPD
Kindle price path ($, markup in parentheses)
2008 318 (82) 347 (111) 215 (-21) 328 (92)
2009 278 (93) 268 (83) 187 (2) 267 (82)
2010 247 (103) 218 (74) 167 (23) 212 (68)
2011 224 (111) 184 (71) 155 (42) 173 (60)
2012 207 (118) 159 (60) 148 (59) 146 (57)
E-book price path ($)
2008 9.66 9.79 10.70 9.87
2009 9.66 10.29 10.70 10.54
2010 9.66 10.66 10.70 10.93
2011 9.66 10.87 10.70 11.24
2012 9.66 11.01 10.70 11.48
Penetration rate by 2012 (%)
avid readers 38.5% 27.6% 33.9% 27.1%
general readers 2.87% 2.36% 3.07% 2.30%
Discounted profits (2008-2012, million $)
total 10,576 9,765 22,190 23,027
from Kindles 1,796 1,000 956 2,200
from books 8,780 8,765 21,233 20,827
Notes: Specification (i) shows the scenario in which the share of avid readers in the initial
market is at the estimated level of 7.47%. Specification (ii) shows the scenario in which the
share is 30%.
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Figure 6: Fractions of Avid Readers in Kindle Sales
general readers, while the opposite price change will discourage avid readers and
attract general readers. In other words, manipulating two price instruments can
induce different demand responses from avid and general readers. The firm can
use different price path combinations to induce different consumer types to make
purchases. This echoes the importance of modeling self-selection based on consumer
heterogeneity.
Second, the joint IPD policy limits consumers’ strategic behaviors by providing
conflicting incentives to arbitrage on price changes over time. Instead of delaying
purchase as in the traditional literature, consumers adopt Kindles earlier even at
higher Kindle prices. The firm not only extracts more Kindle profits but also earns
more book profits from subsequent book sales. Figure 7 plots the Kindle sales by
consumer type over time under the single IPD case and the joint IPD case. The total
Kindle sales are normalized to 100 for each type in each case so that I can focus on
the consumer arbitrage behavior. In the single IPD case, avid readers delay purchase
as the Kindle price drops from $318 in 2008 to $207 in 2012 (markup increases, so
still “investing”). Interestingly, they adopt Kindles earlier in the joint IPD case, even
though the Kindle price is higher and drops faster from $347 to $159. This is driven by
increasing e-book prices over time. General readers are much less responsive. In the
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Figure 7: Kindle Sales Over Time
Notes: To focus on the sales distribution over time, I normalize the total sales of each
consumer type to 100 under each scenario.
traditional IPD literature, forward-looking consumers strategically delay purchase
and hurt firm profitability. In the joint IPD case, consumers have two conflicting
incentives: They should delay purchase given declining Kindle prices but should adopt
earlier given increasing e-book prices. This limits their ability to intertemporally
arbitrage.
The two mechanisms discussed above contribute to the profitability of jointly
conducting IPD on Kindles and e-books. However, profitability is not guaranteed.
Given that consumers will arbitrage on price changes, it might be better to commit
to a fixed price. This is also true in the traditional single-product IPD. I find that
profitability of the joint IPD increases when there are more avid readers. Table 5
compares the scenario in which the share of avid readers in the initial market is at
the estimated level of 7.47% (specification i) with the scenario in which the share
is 30% (specification ii). If the fraction of avid readers is 30%, Amazon will benefit
substantially from the joint IPD policy; given that the observed Kindle ecosystem and
its related business produced $10.6 billion profits from 2008 to 2012, the total profit
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gain is $837 million.42 If the fraction of avid readers is too low as estimated from the
data, it is better to commit to a fixed e-book price. Committing to a fixed e-book
price is better under the estimated market composition for two reasons. First, under
the joint IPD policy, the firm can harvest avid readers using high Kindle prices while
keeping Kindles attractive using low e-book prices. Yet low e-book prices cannot
effectively keep general readers, who are less price sensitive to books; high Kindle
prices substantially discourage them from adopting. The firm needs a large enough
share of avid readers in the initial market to induce profitability. Second, the degree
of harvesting/investing depends on the mix of consumer types. If the fraction of
general readers is too high, the firm would adjust the price level to accommodate the
general readers, resulting in a deviation from the optimal pricing strategy to attract
avid readers.
6.3. Discussion
The last section presents the optimal joint IPD policy and discusses its advantages
and profitability. In this section, I compare Amazon’s observed pricing strategy with
the proposed policy. Given that the estimated avid reader share is 7.47%, the model
predicts that Amazon should commit to a fixed e-book price and invest in Kindles by
starting with a low mark-up. Figure 8 shows that in practice Amazon also committed
to a fixed e-book price but reduced Kindle prices faster than what the model would
suggest. Note that the focus of this dissertation is not to rationalize the observed
policy. The fact that the observed policy differs from the proposed policy does not
imply that Amazon behaves suboptimally. The difference arises because in practice
Amazon is solving for a more complex problem. It faced competition from Barnes &
Noble’s NOOK and Apple’s iPad after 2010, which provided pricing-cutting incentives
42See http://allthingsd.com/20130812/amazon-to-sell-4-5-billion-worth-of-kindles
-this-year-morgan-stanley-says/ and Amazon Annual Financial Statements 2010, 2012.
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Figure 8: Observed Prices vs. Simulated Prices
to maintain market share. It lost the e-book pricing right from 2010 to 2012 because
of an e-book contract switch.43 It also made innovation choices along with the pricing
choices. I do not have data on competitors and R&D. Incorporating all these factors
is also computationally prohibitive. Yet the monopolist’s dynamic pricing problem
in a complementary product setting is both important and interesting to address. I
provide a framework to understand the basic trade-offs and how firms can possibly
benefit from joint IPD strategies in this novel setting.
The results shed light on the pricing incentives behind Amazon’s reputation for
“pricing-at-cost” for Kindles and e-books. I find some evidence that Amazon chooses
this strategy because of business spillover effects from e-books to other products.
First, there is a positive correlation between Kindle ownership and buying paperbacks
from Amazon. If the correlation comes from a spillover effect, it means that e-reading
brings additional paperback sales to Amazon. Second, there is a spillover effect to
other product categories. In the simulation, I allow for a spillover effect per book
transaction to obtain a more realistic marginal cost of selling books for Amazon. The
43The model can be extended to accommodate the contract change by modifying Amazon’s profit
function. The model-predicted prices are comparable to the observed Kindle prices during the new
contract period, providing another validation of the model setup.
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calibrated spillover effect is $5.50 per book transaction.44 Survey results also exhibit
a similar spillover effect: Kindle owners spend 56% more with Amazon as compared
with Kindle nonowners (Consumer Intelligence Research Partners, 2012).45 As the
Kindle ecosystem comprised 11% of Amazon’s total revenue in 2013, the existence of
this spillover effect could provide large incentives for Amazon to promote the e-book
business.46
44To validate this number, notice that Kindles with no ads are $30 more expensive than those
with ads. A typical Kindle owner buys 5.2 more books than a nonowner and produces $28.6 extra
spillover effect based on the model prediction. Kindle ad revenue is comparable to one-year additional
spillover effect due to Kindle adoption. Model predictions are robust to other spillover effect sizes.
45See http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/devices/article/50601-
the-kindle-multiplier.html.
46See http://allthingsd.com/20130812/amazon-to-sell-4-5-billion-worth-of-kindles
-this-year-morgan-stanley-says/.
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CHAPTER 7
Cannibalization or Market
Expansion? The Impact of
E-Books on Print Book Sales
I can use the estimated demand system to explore the impact of e-books on print book
sales. The model is well suited to address this issue because it captures the substitu-
tion pattern between paperbacks and e-books and the device adoption decision. The
former determines the individual-level cannibalization and market expansion effects,
and the latter influences the number of consumers who read e-books and generate the
two effects. The components of the demand model are directly linked to the cannibal-
ization and market expansion effects. Cannibalization happens when two conditions
hold: (1) the consumer would buy paperbacks in the absence of e-books, and (2) the
consumer would prefer e-books to paperbacks when he can choose from both formats.
Market expansion happens when the second condition holds and the first condition
does not hold. In the model, the first condition is determined by the baseline taste
parameters θig. The second condition is determined by the e-format taste parameters
θEg and the price differences between e-books and paperbacks.
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In this chapter, I explore the degrees of cannibalization and market expansion
effects given observed e-reader and e-book prices. I further ask how the effect sizes
would change if e-book prices increase by $2. The motivation of the counterfactual
comes from a policy change in practice. Publishers were concerned about the canni-
balization effect of the low-priced e-books. They sought to raise e-book prices of the
new releases and New York Times best sellers by $2 in 2010. I ask whether cannibal-
ization is indeed weaker and whether the publishing industry would benefit from this
price change. Amazon was deprived of the e-book pricing right and collected 30% of
the book revenues from 2010 to 2012. I construct the firm problem similarly as in Sec-
tion 3.3 except that Amazon only solves for optimal Kindle prices in this chapter. The
book profits generated by each Kindle owner becomes r1 = λpEqE +
(
pP − wP ) qP1A,
where λ = 0.3 is the fraction of e-book revenue shared by Amazon.
7.1. Effect Sizes Under Observed Pricing
I first examine the impact of e-books given current e-book and e-reader prices. At the
individual level, I use consumers’ book consumption before and after Kindle adoption
to evaluate the gain (loss) from converting a Kindle nonowner to an owner. At the
aggregate level, I quantify the degrees of cannibalization and market expansion effects
and evaluate the gain (loss) from introducing e-books. The results illustrate how e-
books affect consumers’ book consumption and how beneficial it is for publishers and
Amazon to promote e-reading.
The calculation proceeds as follows: Given the demand estimates and the ob-
served Kindle and e-book pricing, I simulate the market without e-books and calculate
the paperback sales SP0 that would have occurred on Amazon, on other online retail-
ers, and at oﬄine bookstores. I then take the difference of the simulated sales SP0
and observed sales SP1 to get the degree of cannibalization and market expansion
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effects, overall and for each retailer. In particular, I denote the total e-book sales
as SE. Part of the e-book sales comes from cannibalization, which is represented
by the loss of paperback unit sales due to e-books SP0 − SP1. The rest of the e-
book sales comes from market expansion, which is represented by the incremental
book sales in e-format that would not otherwise have occurred in paperback format
SE − (SP0 − SP1).47 The cannibalization rate is defined as the percentage of total
e-book sales that comes from cannibalization S
P0−SP1
SE
. In terms of book revenue,
cannibalization loss is defined as the number of cannibalization e-books times the
difference in average paperback and e-book prices
(
SP0 − SP1) (pP − pE). Market
expansion gain is defined as the number of market expansion e-books times the av-
erage e-book price
[
SE − (SP0 − SP1)] pE. The difference between cannibalization
loss and market expansion gain is the net impact of e-books on the industry prof-
its. Individual-level calculation follows the same procedure except that I substitute
individual book quantity choices for aggregate book sales.
At the individual consumer level, I find that both avid readers and general readers
buy more books after adopting Kindles as shown in Table 4. Yet converting them to
Kindle owners (i.e., e-book readers) is not always profitable. Besides, the conversion
affects publishers and Amazon differently. General readers have lower industrywide
cannibalization rates (8.1%), and converting them is more profitable for the industry.
Avid readers have higher industrywide cannibalization rates (59.2%) and are easier to
convert, while converting them is more profitable for Amazon.48 In terms of dollars,
47This market expansion effect does not include incremental paperback sales ∆SP caused by e-
books through, for instance, word-of-mouth effect from e-book consumers. If such an effect exists,
my approach would underestimate the cannibalization effect by ∆SP because SP1 = SP0 +4SP −
cannibalization. The model does not contain a network effect to capture ∆SP . However, I believe
that word-of-mouth is more relevant at the book title level, while my model is at the genre level.
Still, I am able to capture consumers’ incremental book consumption once they start e-reading.
48Avid readers and general readers have different cannibalization rates because two conditions
jointly induce cannibalization: 1) the consumer will buy paperbacks in the absence of e-books, and
2) the consumer prefers e-books to paperbacks when he can choose from both formats. The two
types have the same probability of satisfying the second condition because they share the same
e-format preference. The avid readers, however, are much more likely to satisfy the first condition,
as they have higher reading tastes.
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converting a typical avid (general) reader to a Kindle owner leads to a $10.98 loss
($35.69 gain) per year for the industry. In contrast, converting a typical avid (general)
reader leads to a $35.67 gain ($12.46 gain) per year for Amazon. The difference comes
from two sources: (1) Amazon is only one of the paperback retailers that the industry
cares about, and (2) Amazon earns additional paperback profits from Kindle owners
who are more likely to choose Amazon to buy paperbacks. The difference may provide
Amazon and publishers with different incentives to promote e-reading. For instance,
converting avid readers leads to a loss for the industry. However, source (2) is large
enough for Amazon to benefit from it and seek to attract avid readers even at the
expense of the industrywide profits.
Accounting for the size and mix of Kindle owners yields the impact of e-books at
the aggregate level. I find that the industry benefits from the introduction of e-books
because the overall market expansion gain is larger than the overall cannibalization
loss. Yet the cannibalization loss is unevenly born by different paperback retailers.
In Figure 9, I plot the cannibalization and market expansion effects and the decom-
position of cannibalization effect by retailer over time. I find that 42% of e-book sales
come from cannibalizing paperbacks and that 58% come from market expansion.49
Of the cannibalization effect, oﬄine bookstores bear 53% of the loss, other online
retailers bear 15%, and Amazon bears 32%.
The simulation results also shed light on how the effect sizes would change in the
future. I find that the overall cannibalization rate drops from 45.7% in 2008 to 39.6%
in 2012 and that the cannibalization burden is switching to Amazon over time. This
49The results can be validated using model-free evidence from the data. There is a limited set of
households whose book transactions are observed before and after Kindle adoption. Comparing their
book consumption as a Kindle nonowner and owner, I can obtain a cannibalization rate of 40.5%.
This calculation does not account for heterogeneous consumer tastes. There is also qualitative
evidence from the industry. Lulu.com is a leading print and digital self-publishing service provider
for over 1 million authors. It reported that those authors who published their books in both print and
e-book formats tended to sell double the amount of books (http://www.the-digital-reader.com/
2012/04/20/ebook-sales-dont-undercut-print-sales-lulu-reports/\#.U3IjQa1dU00). The
cannibalization effect is much smaller than what traditional publishers thought it to be.
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Figure 9: Cannibalization and Market Expansion
x-axis: years
is likely to continue given the current industry conditions. There are two underlying
driving forces for the trend. First, the mix of Kindle owners evolves over time. Avid
readers are the early adopters. As their market saturates, general readers start to
constitute a larger share of Kindle owners, and they have lower cannibalization rates.
It means that the industry would benefit even more from e-books in the future.
Second, consumers are migrating from oﬄine to online, and from other retailers to
Amazon. As Amazon becomes a larger paperback retailer over time, it shoulders
more cannibalization burden. Amazon can still benefit from the trend as long as the
increase in cannibalization burden is smaller than the increase in book sales.
7.2. Effect Sizes Under Alternative E-Book Prices
The previous section explores the impact of e-books under observed prices. Publishers
and retailers can change e-reader and e-books prices to change the magnitudes of the
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cannibalization and market expansion effects. In particular, e-book prices affect the
individual-level effect, or the gain (loss) from an additional Kindle owner. E-book
and Kindle prices jointly affect the aggregate-level effect by determining the size and
mix of Kindle owners.
In this section, I use a simulation to explore whether raising e-book prices by $2,
similar to what publishers did in 2010, would reduce cannibalization and benefit the
publishing industry. Accounting for Amazon’s Kindle pricing response is important
to obtain the full effect of this e-book price change. I first solve for Amazon’s optimal
dynamic pricing strategies given the observed and new e-book prices. I then simulate
the Kindle price paths and compare the market outcomes under three scenarios: (1)
the e-book price is at the observed level of $9.72; (2) the e-book price increases to
$11.72, while the Kindle prices remain unchanged; and (3) the e-book price increases
to $11.72, and Amazon responds by adjusting the Kindle prices optimally. The results
are presented in Table 6.
I first keep Kindle prices unchanged as in Column (ii). At the individual level,
a higher e-book price reduces e-book sales per Kindle owner as well as the size of
cannibalization and market expansion each owner creates (measured in number of
books). A higher e-book price also makes Kindle less attractive and reduces the
number of Kindle owners. The aggregate effect is that both cannibalization loss and
market expansion gain drop. The net effect on the industry profits is negative: The
benefit from e-book introduction decreases substantially by 67.5%.
When allowing Kindle prices to change as in Column (iii), I find that the situa-
tion is even worse. Interestingly, a higher e-book price induces higher Kindle prices,
according to the firm’s first-order condition. This is because consumers buy fewer
e-books and provide lower gains for Amazon to convert nonowners to owners. The
higher Kindle prices further reduce the number of Kindle owners. Cannibalization loss
and market expansion gain drop even more, and the industry’s benefit from e-book
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Table 6: Effects of Raising E-book Prices
(i) (ii) (iii)
Kindle Price Path ($)
2008 174 174 292
2009 141 141 247
2010 116 116 212
2011 99 99 186
2012 88 88 167
Penetration rate by 2012 (%)
avid readers 34.1% 29.0% 13.0%
general readers 4.9% 4.6% 2.6%
Industry revenues (2008-2012, $)
cannibalization loss 36,857 10,300 5,082
market expansion gain 44,148 12,670 6,589
net gain 7,291 2,370 (-67.5%) 1,507 (-79.3%)
Notes: In specification (i), the e-book price is $9.72; in specification (ii), the e-book price
increases to $11.72, while Kindle prices remain unchanged; in specification (iii), the e-
book price increases to $11.72, and Kindle prices are allowed to adjust optimally. The
magnitudes of the revenues are for the data sample. For the last row, percentage changes
from specification (i) are in parentheses.
introduction drops by 79.3%.
The simulation results imply that increasing e-book prices by $2 makes the in-
dustry worse off. The key is that higher e-book prices induce higher Kindle prices,
which substantially discourage general readers from adopting Kindles. The loss from
a smaller market expansion effect outweighs the gain from a smaller cannibalization
effect. The simulation also illustrates the misaligned incentives between publishers
and Amazon. Amazon and publishers differ in their gains from e-books. While Ama-
zon adjusts Kindle prices optimally for itself, publishers can get hurt in the process.
Kindle serves as the gateway product to e-reading, yet its pricing may work against
the diffusion of e-reading.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
I estimate a dynamic discrete-continuous model of consumer e-reader and book pur-
chases and use the estimated demand system to simulate firm strategies and market
outcomes. The results provide a better understanding of consumer demand and firm
strategy in the e-book market.
Chapter 2 to Chapter 6 provides a framework to understand the joint IPD strat-
egy for hardware and software. I start with estimating a dynamic demand model of
e-readers and e-books using individual transaction data. I then use the estimated de-
mand system to compute the firm’s optimal dynamic pricing strategy. Two modeling
decisions are important: (1) accounting for consumer heterogeneity in reading tastes,
as different types of consumers generate different book revenues and respond differ-
ently to price changes; and (2) accounting for the dynamic device adoption decision,
as it allows for self-selection based on heterogeneous consumer tastes.
The demand-side estimation reveals a novel dimension of consumer heterogeneity
that firms can exploit in the complementary product setting. The supply-side simu-
lation proposes a novel joint IPD strategy from which firms can benefit in two ways.
Firms can better screen consumers and limit consumers’ ability to intertemporally
arbitrage. The profitability of the joint IPD strategy increases as the percentage of
avid readers increases in the initial market. The study provides new insights into the
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traditional pricing approach for books. Traditional book prices are set at standard
discounts off list prices and remain flat over time. I find that retailers can conduct
IPD on e-books to improve profitability, especially given that e-book prices are easily
adjustable because of their digital nature.
The key underlying mechanism of the joint IPD policy is the following. The
usage intensity of the software drives the adoption of the hardware. It leads to the
difference in the relative demand elasticity between hardware and software. This
demand heterogeneity further leads to the difference in supply-side optimal price
trajectory combinations of hardware and software. The results are applicable to
other industries such as consoles and video games, Apple TVs and digital content on
iTunes, razors and blades, printers and cartridges, and K-cups and espresso machines.
One needs to estimate the relative demand elasticities for different consumer types
and the consumer mix. The overall price trajectory and profitability depend on the
mix of consumer types.
Chapter 7 examines the impact of e-books on print book sales. At the individual
level, both avid readers and general readers buy more books after becoming Kindle
owners. Yet a higher percentage of avid readers’ e-book consumption comes from
cannibalizing paperbacks. General readers have lower cannibalization rates, but are
more difficult to convert. Amazon benefits more from converting avid readers and
the industry benefits more from converting general readers. The aggregate effect of
e-books depends on (1) the individual-level effects, or the gain from converting a
Kindle nonowner to an owner, and (2) the cumulative number of Kindle owners and
nonowners. The first factor depends solely on e-book prices. The second factor de-
pends on both e-book and Kindle prices. I find that given the observed prices, 42%
of the e-book sales come at the expense of paperback sales, while 58% would not
have occurred in the absence of e-books. The gain from market expansion exceeds
the loss from cannibalization, indicating that e-book is a good opportunity to expand
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the book business. I further show that raising e-book prices by $2 reduces cannibal-
ization loss as well as market expansion gain. The overall effect is negative for the
industry. Higher e-book prices might not help eliminate publishers’ concerns about
cannibalization.
This dissertation has managerial implications for publishers, retailers, and poli-
cymakers in the publishing industry. For oﬄine bookstores, there has been a decline in
the numbers and sales of their products even before the introduction of e-books. The
oﬄine book store sales peaked in 2007, one year before the introduction of Amazon
Kindle, and then steadily declined (U.S. Census Monthly Retail Trade Survey). One
of the largest chain retailers, Borders, closed down in 2011. The number of booksellers
fell to 7,244 establishments by 2012, a reduction of 27.2% from 2007 (Gilbert, 2014).
This dissertation addresses how the introduction of the e-book further drove book
buyers from oﬄine to online. Oﬄine bookstores have to bear the loss from additional
print book sales drop due to e-books (i.e., cannibalization), yet they cannot enjoy the
benefit from the additional book sales created by e-books (i.e., market expansion).
Although Amazon also bears the cannibalization loss as a print book retailer,
it might benefit from e-books in three ways: (1) additional e-book sales because of
market expansion, (2) additional print book sales driven by Kindle adopters (assuming
that the positive correlation between Kindle ownership and Amazon retailer choice
comes from state dependence), and (3) the spillover effect to other product categories.
The second effect suggests that e-books accelerate the shift of book sales from other
retailers to Amazon. If the gain from e-books is large enough, Amazon would have
strong incentives to promote e-book and e-reader sales, even at a loss. The downside
is that Amazon needs to bear a larger cannibalization loss as it becomes a larger
paperback retailer.
Publishers have misaligned incentives with Amazon. There are several reasons
and consequences. First, publishers care about all retailers, not just Amazon. I find
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that converting a general reader is more profitable for publishers, while converting
an avid reader is more profitable for Amazon. The difference in gain from convert-
ing consumers to e-book readers implies that publishers and Amazon differ in their
incentives to promote e-reading. Second, publishers care about book revenue, while
Amazon cares about both book and Kindle profits. For example, simulation results
show that Kindle prices increase in response to a $2 increase in e-book prices, suggest-
ing that Amazon’s e-reader strategy might not help the diffusion of e-reading. Third,
e-books can drive additional paperback sales to Amazon, which provides Amazon with
additional incentives to promote e-reading. In particular, the industrywide print book
sales can drop, while Amazon’s print book sales still increase. In all, publishers need
to be alerted about these differences when making e-book related decisions.
Policymakers should take a long-term view on the impact of e-books. Avid
readers start e-reading earlier and create more cannibalization in the short run. Yet as
more general readers start e-reading, the industrywide cannibalization rate drops. E-
books are not just a challenge, but they are also an opportunity. Policymakers should
also be aware that publishers and Amazon might have different, even conflicting,
incentives and strategies of developing e-reading.
There are possible avenues for future research. First, publishers conspired with
Apple to raise e-book prices in 2010 because they worried about both cannibalization
and that Amazon was becoming so strong that it would dictate the terms of book
sales. An interesting but challenging question is how retailer competition affects
cannibalization, market expansion, and e-book and e-reader pricing strategies. My
monopoly model illustrates the fundamental trade-offs for further competitive anal-
ysis. It is challenging to solve for a dynamic competition model with both e-readers
and e-books, yet the multiproduct setting can lead to potentially interesting competi-
tion patterns. Second, one could model innovation and quality choices in addition to
pricing. These factors may become more important as the e-reader market matures
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and more sales come from upgrading. Third, paperback prices do not change in re-
sponse to e-book introduction both in the model and in practice. Would publishers or
paperback retailers benefit from changing paperback prices? How should they change
the prices? Answers to these questions can be valuable to the future of the publishing
industry in the e-book era.
70
APPENDIX
A. Likelihood Function Construction
Consumers’ optimal format-quantity choices are (summarized from Table 1, subscript
t dropped)
{
qP1∗ig , q
E∗
ig
}
g=1,2,3
=

{0, 0} if pPg >
aPig
bi
, pEg >
aEig
bi{
aPig − bipPg , 0
}
if pPg <
aPig
bi
, pEg >
aEig
bi
, or
pPg <
aPig
bi
, pEg <
aEig
bi
, aPig − bipPg > aEig − bipEg{
0, aEig − bipEg
}
if pPg >
aPig
bi
, pEg <
aEig
bi
, or
pPg <
aPig
bi
, pEg <
aEig
bi
, aPig − bipPg < aEig − bipEg
qP0∗ig =

aPig − bipPg if pPg <
aPig
bi
0 otherwise
where the taste parameters are parameterized as
aPig = a¯
P
ig + η
p
ig = θig + β1D
age
i + η
P
ig
aEig = a¯
E
ig + η
E
ig = θig + β1D
age
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Baseline taste
+
(
θEg + β2D
age
i + β3 log n
E
) · 1 {ebook}︸ ︷︷ ︸
E-format taste
+ηEig
The format-quantity choice probability comes from the error terms in the taste
parameters. Define the realized error terms given the quantity choice qPig as η
(
qPig
) ≡
qPig + bp
P
g − a¯Pig and η
(
qEig
) ≡ qEig + bpEg − a¯Eig. Define the thresholds of worth buying as
η¯Pig ≡ bpPg − a¯Pig and η¯Eig ≡ bpEg − a¯Eig. To simplify the notation, I drop i and g subscripts
for now.
Case 1: A Kindle nonowner. The optimal quantity choice requires that the
71
normally distributed error terms satisfy

ηP = η
(
qP
)
> η¯P if qP > 0
ηP 6 η¯P if qP = 0
The probability of buying qP > 0 number of books is
f
(
ηP = η
(
qP
) | ηP > η¯P )Pr (ηP > η¯P ) = 1
σ
φ
(
η
(
qP
)
σ
)
The probability of buying qP = 0 is
Pr
(
ηP < η¯P
)
= Φ
(
η¯P
σ
)
Here φ (·) and Φ (·) are the PDF and CDF of the standard normal distribution. So
the contribution to the likelihood function for a Kindle nonowner is
lnonowner =
∏
g
[
1
{
qPg > 0
} 1
σ
φ
(
v
(
qPg
)
σ
)
+ 1
{
qPg = 0
}
Φ
(
η¯Pg
σ
)]
Case 2: A Kindle owner. Similarly, the optimal quantity choice requires that the
error terms satisfy

ηP < η¯P , ηE < η¯E if qP = 0, qE = 0
ηP = η
(
qP
)
> max
{
η¯P , ηE +
(
η¯P − η¯E)} if qP > 0, qE = 0
ηE = η
(
qE
)
> max
{
η¯E, ηP − (η¯P − η¯E)} if qP = 0, qE > 0
Intuitively, paperbacks are chosen because they are worth buying (ηP > η¯P ) and
they are better than e-books (ηP > ηE +
(
η¯P − η¯E)), vise versa. The probability
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that qP = 0, qE = 0 is Pr ({0, 0}) = Pr (ηP < η¯P )Pr (ηE < η¯E). The probability that
qP > 0, qE = 0 is Pr
({
qP , 0
})
= f
(
ηP = η
(
qP
) | ηP > max{η¯P , ηE + (η¯P − η¯E)}) ·
Pr
(
ηP > max
{
η¯P , vE +
(
η¯P − η¯E)}). Similar for the probability Pr ({0, qE}). The
last two probabilities are conditional probabilities of a truncated normal distribution
where the truncation point is a result of a maximization operator. I use the quadrature
method to calculate it. The details are presented in Appendix B.
B. Probability and Indirect Utility Calculation
Probability Calculation Notations follow Appendix A. I need to calculate Pr
({
qP , 0
})
,
or the following density
f
(
ηP = η
(
qP
) | ηP > max{η¯P , ηE + (η¯P − η¯E)})Pr (ηP > max{η¯P , ηE + (η¯P − η¯E)})
where ηP and ηE are i.i.d. normally distributed error terms with mean 0 and vari-
ance σ2. η¯P , and η¯E are known deterministic parts. Define Λ ≡ (η¯P − η¯E) to simplify
the discussions below. It is easier to start with calculating the CDF instead of the
PDF: Pr
(
ηP 6 η
(
qP
) | ηP > max{η¯P , ηE + Λ}) ·Pr (ηP > max{η¯P , ηE + Λ}). De-
fine ηP 6 η
(
qP
)
as event A, ηP > η¯P as event B, ηP > ηE + Λ as event C, and
η¯P > ηE +Λ as event D. Then the CDF can be written as Pr (A | B ∩ C) Pr (B ∩ C).
Notice that event B ∩D implies event C, and event C ∩ ¬D implies event B. Event
B and event D are independent. For the first component,
Pr (A | B ∩ C) = Pr (A | B ∩ C ∩D) Pr (D) + Pr (A | B ∩ C ∩ ¬D) Pr (¬D)
= Pr (A | B ∩D) Pr (D) + Pr (A | C ∩ ¬D) Pr (¬D)
=
Pr (A ∩B ∩D)
Pr (B ∩D) Pr (D) +
Pr (A ∩ C ∩ ¬D)
Pr (C ∩ ¬D) Pr (¬D)
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where Pr (B) =
[
1− Φ
(
η¯P
σ
)]
, Pr (D) = Φ
(
η¯P−Λ
σ
)
, Pr (¬D) = 1 − Φ
(
η¯P−Λ
σ
)
,
Pr (B ∩D) = Pr (B) Pr (D) and
Pr (A ∩B ∩D) =
[
Φ
(
η
(
qP
)
σ
)
− Φ
(
η¯P
σ
)]
Φ
(
η¯P − Λ
σ
)
Pr (A ∩ C ∩ ¬D) =
∫ η(qP )
η¯P+1
[
Φ
(
x− Λ
σ
)
− Φ
(
η¯P − Λ
σ
)]
dFx
=
∫ η(qP )
η¯P+1
Φ
(
x− Λ
σ
)
dFx − Φ
(
η¯P − Λ
σ
)
Φ
(
η
(
qP
)
σ
)
Pr (C ∩ ¬D) =
∫ +∞
η¯P
[
Φ
(
x− Λ
σ
)
− Φ
(
η¯P − Λ
σ
)]
dFx
=
∫ +∞
η¯P
Φ
(
x− Λ
σ
)
dFx − Φ
(
η¯P − Λ
σ
)[
1− Φ
(
η¯P
σ
)]
For the second component
Pr (B ∩ C) = Pr (B ∩ C | D) Pr (D) + Pr (B ∩ C | ¬D) Pr (¬D)
= Pr (B ∩ C ∩D) + Pr (B ∩ C ∩ ¬D)
= Pr (B ∩D) + Pr (C ∩ ¬D)
= Pr (B) Pr (D) + Pr (C ∩ ¬D)
=
∫ +∞
η¯P
Φ
(
x− Λ
σ
)
dFx
In all, CDF
(
η
(
qP
))
= Pr (A | B ∩ C) Pr (B ∩ C) =
[
(a−b)c
1−b +
I1−ac
I2−c(1−b) (1− c)
]
I2,
where a = Φ
(
η(qP )
σ
)
, b = Φ
(
η¯P
σ
)
, c = Φ
(
η¯P−Λ
σ
)
, I1 =
∫ η(qP )
η¯P+1
Φ
(
x−Λ
σ
)
dFx and
I2 =
∫ +∞
η¯P
Φ
(
x−Λ
σ
)
dFx.
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Now we are ready to calculate the PDF by taking a derivative of the CDF:
f
(
ηT = x | ηT > max{η¯T , η−T + (η¯T − η¯−T )})
=

a′c
1−b +
I′1−a′c
I2−c(1−b) (1− c) if x > η¯T
0 otherwise
where a′ = 1
σ
φ
(
x
σ
)
, b = Φ
(
η¯T
σ
)
, c = Φ
(
η¯T−Λ
σ
)
, I ′1 = Φ
(
x−Λ
σ
)
fx (x) and I2 =∫ +∞
η¯T
Φ
(
x−Λ
σ
)
dFx. fx and Fx are the PDF and CDF of N (0, σ
2).
Taking into account the fact that book quantities are integers, the ultimate
probability to calculate is
Pr
(
η
(
qP
)
6 ηP < η
(
qP + 1
) | ηP > max{η¯P + 1, ηE + Λ})
·Pr (ηP > max{η¯P + 1, ηE + Λ})
= CDF
(
η
(
qP + 1
))− CDF (η (qP ))
=
[
a˜c
1− b +
I˜1 − a˜c
I2 − c(1− b) (1− c)
]
I2
where a˜ = Φ
(
η(qP+1)
σ
)
− Φ
(
η(qP )
σ
)
and I˜1 =
∫ η(qP+1)
η(qP )
Φ
(
x−Λ
σ
)
dFx. There are two
integrals to calculate: I˜1 =
∫ η(qP+1)
η(qP )
Φ
(
x−Λ
σ
)
dFx and I2 =
∫ +∞
η¯P
Φ
(
x−Λ
σ
)
dFx. I use
Gauss-Chebychev quadrature with 10 nodes to calculate the first one and Gauss-
Laguerre quadrature with 10 nodes to calculate the second one.
Indirect Flow Utility A Kindle nonowner has the following ex-ante indirect
flow utility from books:
vbook,0i = yi +
∑
g
E
((
aPig − bipPg
)2
2bi
| qPig > 0
)
Pr
(
qPig > 0
)
= yi +
1
2bi
∑
g
E
((
ηPig − η¯Pig
)2 | ηPig − η¯Pig > 0)Pr (ηPig − η¯Pig > 0)
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where X ≡ ηPig − η¯Pig ∼ N
(−η¯Pig, σ2) and Pr (ηPig − η¯Pig > 0) = 1 − Φ( η¯Pigσ ). From the
truncated normal distribution properties, we know that
E
(
X2 | X > 0) = V ar (X | X > 0) + [E (X | X > 0)]2
= σ2 [1− λ (α) (λ (α)− α)] + [−η¯Pig + σλ (α)]2
where α =
η¯Pig
σ
and λ (α) = φ(α)
1−Φ(α) . This is a closed form solution.
A Kindle owner has the following ex-ante flow utility from books:
vbook,1i = yi +
∑
T=P,E
∑
g
E
((
aTig − bipTg
)2
2bi
| qTig > 0, q−Tig = 0
)
Pr
(
qTig > 0, q
−T
ig = 0
)
= yi +
1
2bi
·∑
g
E
((
ηPig − η¯Pig
)2 | ηPig > max{η¯Pig, ηEig + Λ})Pr (ηPig > max{η¯Pig, ηEig + Λ})
+E
((
ηEig − η¯Eig
)2 | ηEig > max{η¯Eig, ηPig − Λ})Pr (ηEig > max{η¯Eig, ηPig − Λ})
where the probability Pr
(
ηPig > max
{
η¯Pig, η
E
ig + Λ
})
is already calculated in the last
section. To calculate the two conditional expectations, I use the conditional ex-
pectation definitions E [X | H] = ∫ +∞−∞ x · f (x | H) dx and E [X2 | H] = ∫ +∞−∞ x2 ·
f (x | H) dx. The conditional density f (x | H) is calculated in the last section. Given
the conditional density, I calculate the conditional expectations using Gauss-Hermite
quadrature with 10 nodes. Again, I account for the fact that book quantities are
integers when deriving the equations in the final calculation.
C. Computation Algorithm for the Dynamic Pricing Problem
The numerical algorithm is similar to that in Goettler and Gordon (2011). We sum-
marize the algorithm in Figure 10. It contains an inner loop and an outer loop. The
inner loop solves the firm and the consumer maximization problem along with the
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Figure 10: Computation Algorithm
next period state space given the value function guess. The outer loop updates the
value function guess and iterates until convergence.
For each iteration k = 1, 2, ...,
1) Guess the value functions for the firm and the consumers
{
V k−1,W k−1
}
.
2) Given the value function guess, simultaneously solve the firm’s first-order
conditions at each state. Since the first-order conditions depend on consumers’ current
choices and next period ∆′, which in turn depend on their rational expectations of ∆′,
I solve for a fixed point in ∆′ such that consumers’ expectations for ∆′ are realized
according to the state space evolution equation. In particular, to solve for the fixed
point, I first guess the next period state space ∆′m−1 and the firm’s optimal pricing
policy
{
Pm−1, pE,m−1
}
, wherem is the iteration number for the fixed point in the inner
loop. Given the guess, I solve the consumers’ device adoption problem to get updated
next period state space ∆′m. Given the updated ∆′m, I solve the firm’s first-order
conditions at each state and get the updated optimal pricing policy
{
Pm, pE,m
}
.
Check convergence of | ∆′m − ∆′m−1 |, | Pm − Pm−1 |, and | pE,m − pE,m−1 |. If
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converged, let ∆′k and
{
P k, pE,k
}
denote this fixed point. This is the solution to the
inner loop given the value function guess
{
V k−1,W k−1
}
.
3) Update the value functions given the firm’s policy and the next period state
space. Denote them
{
V k,W k
}
.
4) Check for convergence of the outer loop | V k − V k−1 | and | W k −W k−1 | at
the state space grid points ∆. If convergence is not achieved, return to step 2).
Throughout the computation, I discretize the state space evenly into 20 grid
points on both dimensions. The range of the state space is between 0 and the initial
market size of each type. I use a cubic spline to interpolate between the grid points
for the value functions and the policy functions. This is because solving the firm’s
first-order condition requires differentiable continuation values. The convergence is
checked at the grid points.
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